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EXTRACTS FROM 'THE KHRUSHCHEVITES'

BY ENVER HOXHA

Part 1



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Tirana ATA in English 0900 GMT 9-19 Oct 80

["Extracts From the Book by Comrade Enver Hoxha 'The Khrushchevites' (Memoirs) "--ATA headline]

[9 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 9 Oct (ATA)--Beginning with today we begin to broadcast extracts from the new book by Comrade Enver Hoxha "The Khrushchevites" (Memoirs) which came off the press recently. This book which is another work in the series of the author's memoirs, following that "With Stalin," contains memoirs and impressions of the author from the direct meetings and other contacts with the leaders of the C.P.S.U. and other communist and workers' parties during the years 1953-1961, from Stalin's death till the final break off with the Khrushchevites. The talks, meetings, mutual visits, the joint meetings over political, ideological, economic and military problems constitute mainly the basic materials of this book.

At the beginning of this work Comrade Enver Hoxha writes:

Two decades have gone by since the meeting of 81 communist and workers' parties of the world, which has gone down in history as one of the most important events in the struggle which is being waged between Marxism-Leninism and opportunism. At this meeting our party opened fire on the revisionist group of Khrushchev which was ruling in the Soviet Union and struggling in every way to subjugate the entire international communist movement, all the communist and workers' parties of the world, and set them on its road of betrayal.

The counterrevolutionary attack on Khrushchevite revisionism at the meeting in November 1960 was a logical continuation of the Marxist-Leninist stand which the Party of Labour of Albania had always maintained.

Our open and principled attack on Khrushchevite modern revisionism at the meeting in November 1960 was not a surprise move. On the contrary, it was the logical continuation of the Marxist-Leninist stand which the Party of Labour of Albania

had always maintained, was the transition to a new, higher stage of the struggle which our party had long been waging for the defence and consistent application of Marxism-Leninism.

From the time the Khrushchevites took power to the moment when we came out in open confrontation with them, the relations of the Party of Labour of Albania with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union passed through a complicated process, with zig zags, with periods of exacerbation and periods of temporary normalization. This was the process of each getting to know the other through encounters in the course of the struggle and the continual clash of views. After the Khrushchevite Revisionist Putschists came to power, our party, basing itself on the events that were taking place there, on certain stands and actions, which were ill-defined at first, but which, step by step, were becoming more concrete, began to sense the great danger of this clique of renegades, which hid behind a deafening pseudo-Marxist demagoguery, and to understand that this clique was becoming a great threat both to the cause of the revolution and socialism as a whole, and to our country.

The PLA [Party of Labor of Albania] refused to swallow what the Soviet leaders served up to us.

We became more and more aware that the views and stands of Nikita Khrushchev on important questions of the international communist movement and the socialist camp differed from our views and stands. The 20th Congress of the CPSU, in particular, was the event which made us adopt a stand of opposition to Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites. As Marxist-Leninists and in a Marxist-Leninist way, time after time we had pointed out to the Soviet leaders our reservations and objections to their conciliatory stands towards the Yugoslav revisionists, about many aspects of their unprincipled foreign policy, about many of their wrong and completely un-Marxist stands and actions on major international problems, etc. Although they sometimes feigned a retreat, they continued on their course, while we refused to swallow what they served up to us, but on the contrary, defended our views and implemented our internal and external policy.

With the passage of time this brought about that we became better acquainted with each other's positions, and neither side trusted the other. For our part, we continued to preserve our friendship with the Soviet Union, with its peoples, continued to build socialism according to the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, continued as before to defend the great Stalin and his work and to fight unwaveringly against Yugoslav revisionism. Our existing doubts about the Soviet revisionists increased and deepened from day to day, because day by day Khrushchev and company were acting in opposition to Marxism-Leninism.

After the attempts to take the Albanian fortress from within, Khrushchev went openly to the attack to subjugate the P.L.A.

Khrushchev was aware of our reservations about the 20th congress, and about the policy which he followed with the Titoites, imperialism, etc, but his tactic was not to hasten to exacerbate the situation with us Albanians. He hoped to profit from the friendship which we displayed for the Soviet Union to take the Albanian fortress from within and to get us into the bag through smiles and threat, through giving us some reduced credits, as well as through pressure and blockades. Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites thought: "We know the Albanians, however

stubborn they are, however hot-tempered they are, they have nowhere else to turn to, because we have them pinned up and, if they prove difficult, if they don't obey us, then we will show our teeth, we'll cut them off and boycott them, and overthrow all those who oppose us."

The Khrushchev group prepared this course of action, promoted and deepened it, thinking that it would achieve its aim "quietly and gently" and "without any fuss." However, the reality was convincing them that this tactic was yielding no fruit, and thus their impatience and arrogance began to emerge. The situation became tense. Then it was "eased" only to grow tense again. We understood where this course would lead Khrushchev and company, therefore we strengthened our vigilance, and while replying to manifestations of their despotism, we tried to prolong the "peace" while safeguarding our principles.

But the moment came when the cup was full to overflowing. The "peace," which had seemed to exist before, could continue no longer. Khrushchev went openly on to the attack to subjugate and force us to follow his utterly opportunist line. Then we told Khrushchev bluntly and loudly "no," we said "stop," to his treacherous activity. This marked the beginning of a long and very difficult struggle in which our party, to its glory and the glory of the people who gave birth to it and raised it, consistently defended the interests of its socialist homeland, persistently defended Marxism-Leninism and the genuine international communist movement.

Time fully confirmed how right the Party of Labour of Albania was to fight the Khrushchevites and refuse to follow their line.

Albania did not become and will never become a protectorate of the Russians or anyone else.

At that time many people did not understand the stand of the Party of Labour of Albania. There were even well-wishers of our party and country who considered this action hasty. Some had not yet completely understood the Khrushchevites' betrayal, some others thought that we broke away from the Soviet Union to link up with China, etc. Today, not only the friends, but also the enemies of socialist Albania have understood the principled character of the uninterrupted struggle which our party has waged and is waging against opportunists of every hue.

Time has fully confirmed how right the Party of Labour of Albania was to fight the Khrushchevites and refuse to follow their line. To this fight, which demanded and still demands great sacrifices, our small homeland owes the freedom and independence it prizes so highly and its successful development on the road of socialism only thanks to the Marxist-Leninist line of our party did Albania not become and never will become a protectorate of the Russians or anyone else.

We do not maintain and will never establish state relations with the Soviet social-imperialists.

Brezhnev and company have proved to be "worthy pupils" of their ill-famed teacher.

Since 1961 our Party of Labour has not had any link or contact with the Khrushchevites. In the future, too, it will never establish party relations with

them, and we do not have and will never have even state relations with the Soviet social-imperialists. Up to now, our party will consistently wage the ideological and political struggle for the exposure of these enemies of Marxism-Leninism. We acted in this way both when Khrushchev was in power and when he was brought down and replaced by the Brezhnev clique. Our party had no illusions, but on the contrary, was quite certain that Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Mikoyan, etc., who had been Khrushchev's closest collaborators, who had jointly organized and put into practice the revisionist counter-revolution in the Soviet Union, would persist in their former line.

They eliminated Khrushchev with the aim of protecting Khrushchevism from the discredit which the master himself was bringing upon it with his endless buffoonery, eliminated the "father" with the aim of implementing the complete restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union with greater intensity and effectiveness.

In this direction Brezhnev and company have proved to be "worthy pupils" of their ill-famed teacher. Within the Soviet Union they established and strengthened the dictatorial fascist regime, while they turned the foreign policy of their state into a policy of great-state chauvinism, expansion and hegemonism. Under the leadership of the Brezhnev Khrushchevites, the Soviet Union has been turned into an imperialist world power and, like the United States of America, aims to rule the world. Among the bitter evidence of the utterly reactionary policy of Soviet social-imperialism are the tragic events in Czechoslovakia, the strengthening of the domination of the Kremlin over the countries of the Warsaw Treaty, the deepening of their all-round dependence on Moscow and the extension of the tentacles of Soviet social-imperialism to Asia, Africa and elsewhere.

The correct assessments and forecasts of our party about the reactionary internal and foreign policy of Brezhnev have been and are being constantly confirmed. The most recent example is Afghanistan, where the Brezhnev Khrushchevites undertook an open fascist aggression and now are trying to quell the flames of the people's war with fire and steel in order to prolong their social imperialist occupation.

The fact that Albania did not suffer the fate of those who are now languishing under imperialist and social-imperialist slavery is the best testimony to the correctness of the principled, courageous and consistent line of the PLA.

The fact that our small homeland and people have not suffered the tragic fate of all those who are now languishing under imperialist or social-imperialist slavery is the best testimony to the correctness of the consistent, courageous and principled line which our Party of Labour has always followed.

The merit for this correct course belongs to the whole party and, in particular, to its leadership, the Central Committee, which, imbued with and loyal to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, our guiding theory, has always led the party and the people correctly. In the great tests which we have had to withstand, the unity of the party with its leadership and the unity of the people around the party have been brilliant and have become further tempered. This steel unity gave the party support and strength in the difficult but glorious struggle against the Khrushchevite revisionists, too. This unity has been and is the foundation of the stability and confidence with which Albania has marched and is marching forward, withstanding the pressure and blackmail, the blandishments and demagogy of enemies of all hues.

As a communist and leader of the party, I, too, have had to take part actively and make my contribution to all this heroic struggle of our party. Charged by the party and its leadership, since the liberation of Albania, and especially during the years 1950-1960, I have headed delegations of the party and the state many times in official meetings with the Soviet leaders and with the main leaders of other communist and workers' parties. Likewise, many times we have exchanged reciprocal visits, I have taken part in consultations and international meetings of communist parties at which I have expressed and defended the correct line, decisions and instructions of the party. In all these meetings and visits I have become closely acquainted with glorious, unforgettable leaders, like Stalin, Kimitrov, Gottwald, Bierut, Pieck and others, and likewise, I have had to enter into contact with and know the Khrushchevite traitors, who, through a long and complicated process, gradually usurped power in the Soviet Union and in the former countries of people's democracy respectively.

The relations with them and the stands maintained by our party during this period have been reflected in the documents of the party, in my writings which are being published by decision of the central committee, as well as in other documents which are found in the central archives of the party. Now I am handing over these notes for publication as my reminiscences and impressions from the many contacts and clashes with the Khrushchevites, which cover the period from 1953, after the death of Stalin, to the end of 1961, when the Khrushchev group broke off diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Albania. Taken together with other published materials and documents covering that period, these notes, too, I believe, will serve to acquaint the communists and working masses better, both with the counter-revolutionary activity of the Soviet revisionists inside and outside the Soviet Union, and with the always correct and consistent struggle of our party in defence of Marxism-Leninism, the people and our socialist homeland.

[10 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 10 Oct (ATA)--At the beginning of his new book "The Khrushchevites (Memoirs)" Comrade Enver Hoxha speaks of his impressions from the contacts with the Soviet leaders who came to power following Stalin's death, pointing out the lack of unity between them and the in-fighting, Khrushchev's sudden and quick advent to power. Through facts he also shows that the new Soviet leaders were ill-disposed towards Albania.

Comrade Enver Hoxha writes:

In-Fighting Among the Top Soviet Leaders

Stalin dies. Next day the top Soviet leadership divides up the portfolios. Khrushchev climbs the steps to power. Disillusionment from the first meeting with the "new" Soviet leaders in June 1958. Ill-intentioned criticism from Mikoyan and Bulganin. The end of Beria's short-lived reign. The meeting with Khrushchev in June 1954: "You helped in the exposure of Beria." Khrushchev's "theoretical" lecture on the roles of the first secretary of the party and the prime minister. The revisionist Mafia spins its spider's web inside and outside the Soviet Union.

The way in which the death of Stalin was announced and his funeral ceremony was organised, Comrade Enver Hoxha stresses in his memoirs, created the impression amongst us, the Albanian Communists and people, and others like us, that many

members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had been awaiting his death impatiently.

Hidden hands had prepared the plot long before for the destruction of the Bolshevik Party and socialism in the Soviet Union.

One day after Stalin's death on 6 March 1953 the Central Committee of the party, the council of ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were summoned to an urgent joint meeting. On occasions of great losses, such as the death of Stalin, urgent meetings are necessary and indispensable. However, the many important changes which were announced in the press one day later showed that this urgent meeting had been held for no other reason but...the sharing out of posts. Stalin had only just died, his body had not yet been placed in the hall where the final homage was to be paid, the program for the organization of paying homage and the funeral ceremony was still not worked out, the Soviet Communists and the Soviet people were weeping over their great loss, while the top Soviet leadership found the time to share out the portfolios. Malenkov became premier, Beria became first deputy-premier and minister of internal affairs, and Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov shared the other posts. Major changes were made in all the top organs in the party and the state within that day. The presidium and the bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party were merged into a single organ, new secretaries of the Central Committee of the party were elected, a number of ministries were amalgamated or united, changes were made in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, etc.

These actions could not fail to make profound and by no means favourable impressions on us. Disturbing questions arose automatically: How were all these major changes made so suddenly with one day, and not just any ordinary day, but on the first day of mourning! Logic compels us to believe that everything had been prepared in advance. The lists of these changes had been worked out long before in suspicious secrecy and they were simply waiting for the occasion to proclaim them in order to satisfy this one and that one...

It is never possible to make such extremely important decisions within a few hours, even on a completely normal day.

However, if at the start these were only doubts which shocked and surprised us, later developments, the occurrences and the facts which we were to learn about subsequently, made us even more convinced that hidden hands had prepared the plot long before and waited the opportunity to commence the course of the destruction of the Bolshevik Party and socialism in the Soviet Union.

The lack of unity in the Presidium of the Central Committee was made quite obvious at Stalin's funeral, too, when there was strife among the members over who would take pride of place and who would speak first. Instead of displaying unity at a time of misfortune before the peoples of the Soviet Union and all the communists of the world, who were deeply shocked and immensely grieved by the sudden death of Stalin, the "comrades" were competing for the limelight. Khrushchev opened the funeral ceremony, and Malenkov, Beria and Molotov spoke before the Lenin Mausoleum. Khrushchev and the conspirators behaved hypocritically over Stalin's coffin and rushed to get the funeral ceremony over as quickly as possible in order to shut themselves up in the Kremlin again to continue the process of the division and redivision of the posts.

The way in which Khrushchev rose was astonishing and suspect.

We, and many like us, thought that Molotov, Stalin's closest collaborator, the oldest and the most mature Bolshevik, with the greatest experience and best known inside and outside the Soviet Union would be elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But it did not turn out so. Malenkov was placed at the head, with Beria in second place. Behind them in those days, a little more in the shade, stood a "panther" which was preparing itself to gobble up and liquidate the former two. This was Nikita Khrushchev.

The way in which he rose was truly astonishing and suspect: He was appointed only as chairman of the central commission to organize the funeral ceremony for Stalin, and on 7 March when the division of posts was made public, he had not been appointed to any new post, but had simply been freed from the task of first secretary of the Party Committee of Moscow, since "he was to concentrate on the work in the Central Committee of the party." Only a few days later, on 14 March 1953, Malenkov, "at his own request," was relieved of the post of secretary of the Central Committee of the party and Nikita Khrushchev was listed first in the composition of the new secretariat elected that same day.

Stalin has fought consistently for the Marxist-Leninist unity of the C.P. of the Soviet Union.

After his death the Khrushchevites encouraged the split.

Such actions did not please us at all, although they were not our responsibility. We were disillusioned in our opinions about the stability of the top Soviet leadership, but we explained this with our being totally uninformed about the situation developing in the party and the leadership of the Soviet Union. In the contacts which I had had with Stalin himself, with Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, Beria, Mikoyan, Suslov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and other main leaders, I had not seen even the smallest division or discord amongst them.

Stalin has fought consistently for and was one of the decisive factors of the Marxist-Leninist unity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This unity in the party for which Stalin worked was not created by means of terror, as Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites claimed later, continuing the slanders of the imperialists and the world capitalist bourgeoisie, who were striving to destroy and overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, but was based on the triumphs of socialism, on the Marxist-Leninist line and ideology of the Bolshevik Party and on the indisputably great personality of Stalin. The trust which all had in Stalin was based on his justice and the ability with which he defended the Soviet Union and Leninism. Stalin waged the class struggle correctly, dealing merciless blows at the enemies of socialism (and he was quite right to do so). The concrete daily struggle of Stalin, the Bolshevik Party and the whole Soviet people proves this squarely, as do the political and ideological writings of Stalin, the documents and decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and also the press and the mass propaganda of those times against the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Zinovievites, the Tukhachevskies, and all other traitors. This was a stern political and ideological class struggle to defend socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the party and the principles of Marxism-Leninism. For this Stalin has great merits.

Stalin proved himself to be an outstanding Marxist-Leninist with clear principles, with great courage and cool-headedness, and the maturity and foresight of a Marxist revolutionary. If we just reflect on the strength of the external and internal enemies in the Soviet Union, on the manoeuvres and unrestrained propaganda they indulged in, on the fiendish tactics they used, then we can properly appreciate the principles and correct actions of Stalin at the head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. If there were some excesses in the course of this just and titanic struggle, it was not Stalin who committed them, but Khrushchev, Beria and company, who for sinister hidden motives showed themselves the most zealous for purges at the time when they were not yet so powerful. They acted in this way to gain credit as "ardent defenders" of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as "merciless with the enemies," with the aim of climbing the steps in order to usurp power later. The facts show that when Stalin discovered the hostile activity of a Yagoda or a Yezhov, the revolutionary court condemned them without hesitation. Such elements as Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Beria and their apparatchiki hid the truth from Stalin. In one way or another, they misled and deceived Stalin. He did not trust them, therefore he had told them to their faces, "...when I am gone you will sell the Soviet Union." Khrushchev himself admitted this. And it turned out just as Stalin foresaw. As long as he was alive, even these enemies talked about unity, but after his death they encouraged the split. This process was being steadily extended.

From the visits which I made from time to time to the Soviet Union after 1953, for consultations over the problems of the political and economic situation, or over some problems of international policy which were raised by the Soviets, who allegedly sought our opinion, too. I saw more and more clearly the sharpening of contradictions among the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

This behaviour of the new Soviet leaders was supposed to show the pride of the great state.

A few months after Stalin's death, in June 1953, I went to Moscow at the head of a party and government delegation to seek an economic and military credit.

It was the time when Malenkov seemed to be the main leader. He was chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. Although Khrushchev had been listed first among the secretaries of the Central Committee of the party since March 1953, apparently he had not yet seized power completely, had still not prepared the putsch.

We normally made our requests in advance in writing, thus the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party and government of the Soviet Union had long been aware of them and, indeed as it turned out, they had decided what they would give us and what they would not give us. They received us at the Kremlin. When we entered the room the Soviet leaders stood up and we shook hands with them. We exchanged the normal greetings.

I had met them all in the time of Stalin. Malenkov looked just the same--a heavy-built man with a pale, hairless face. I had met him years before in Moscow, during meetings I had with Stalin, and he had made a good impression on me. He worshipped Stalin and it seemed to me that Stalin valued him, too. At the 19th Congress

Malenkov delivered the report on behalf of the Central Committee of the party. He was one of the relatively new cadres who came into the leadership and who were liquidated later by the disguised revisionist Khrushchev and his associates. But now he was at the head of the table, holding the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Beside him stood Beria, with his eyes glittering behind glasses and his hands never still. After him came Molotov, quiet and good-looking, one of the most serious and most honoured comrades for us, because he was an old Bolshevik from the time of Lenin and a close comrade of Stalin's. We still thought of Molotov in this way even after Stalin's death.

Next to Molotov was Mikoyan, his dark face scowling. This merchant was holding one of those thick pencils, half red half blue (something you could see in all the offices of the Soviet Union), and was keeping the "score." Now he had taken even greater authority into his hands. On 6 March, the day the posts were shared out, it was decided that the Ministry of Foreign Trade and that of Internal Trade should be combined in one, and the Armenian wheeler-dealer grabbed the portfolio.

Finally there was the bearded Marshal Belganin, with white hair and pale blue eyes, sitting a little bit bemused at a corner of the table.

"Let us hear what you have to say," said Malenkov in a very grave tone. This was not at all a comradely beginning. This was to become the custom in talks with the new Soviet leaders, and no doubt this behaviour was supposed to show the pride of the great state. "Well, say what you have to say to us, we shall listen to you and pronounce our final opinion."

I did not know Russian well, I could not speak it, but I could understand it. The talk was conducted through an interpreter.

I began to speak about the problems that were worrying us, especially about military questions and the problems of the economy. First, I gave an introduction about the internal and external political situation of our country, which was causing us some concern. It was essential to give solid reasons for our needs, to back up our requests in both the economic and military sectors. In connection with the latter, the aid which they provided for our army was always insufficient and minimal, regardless of the fact that in public we always spoke very highly of the value of that small amount of aid which they granted us.

My concern was to make my expose as concrete and concise as possible. I tried not to go on at too great a length and I had been speaking for no more than 20 minutes, when I heard Beria, with his snake's eyes, say to Malenkov, who was sitting listening to me as expressionless as a mummy:

"Can't we say what we have to say and put an end to this?"

Without changing his expression, without shifting his eyes from me (of course, he had to maintain his authority in front of his deputies), Malenkov said to Beria:

"Wait."

I was so annoyed I was ready to explode internally, but I preserved my aplomb and, in order to let them understand that I had heard and understood what they said, I cut down my talk and said to Malenkov:

"I have finished."

"Pravilno." That's right (Russian in the original), said Malenkov and gave Mikoyan the floor.

Malenkov and Beria seemed to be the two "cocks of the walk."

Mikoyan made some vicious and venomous remarks.

Beria, pleased that I had finished, put his hands in his pockets and tried to work out what impression their replies were making on me. Of course, I was not satisfied with what they had decided to give as a response to the very modest requests we had made. I spoke again and told them that they had made heavy reductions in the things we had asked for. Mikoyan stepped in to "explain" that the Soviet Union itself was poor, that it had gone through the war, that it had to assist other countries, too, etc.

"When we drafted these requests," I told Mikoyan, "we took account of the reason you have just given, indeed we cut our calculations very fine, and your specialists who work in our country are witnesses to this."

"Our specialists do not know what possibilities the Soviet Union had. We who have told you our opinions and possibilities know these things," said Mikoyan.

Molotov was leaning on the table. He said something about Albania's relations with its neighbours, but he never raised his eyes. Malenkov and Beria seemed to be the two "cocks of the walk," while Mikoyan who was cold and bitter, did not say much, but when he did speak, it was only to make some vicious and venomous remark. From the way they spoke, the way they interrupted one another, the arrogant tone in which they gave "advice," the signs of discord among them were quite clear.

[11 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 11 Oct (ATA)--Bulganin slanders against the cadres of the Albanian Army and requires that purges be carried out.

In continuation of his notes on the first meeting with the Soviet leadership in June 1953, after Stalin's death, Comrade Enver Hoxha quotes also Bulganin's slanders at this meeting, who said among the other things that he had been informed that many cadres of the Albanian Army were the sons of Beys and Aghas, of dubious origin and activity. "We must be certain about those into whose hands these weapons, with which we shall supply you, will be put, he went on, therefore we advise you to study this problem deeply and carry out purges..."

This made my blood boil, Comrade Enver Hoxha writes, because it was a slanderous accusation and an insult to the cadres of our army. I raised my voice and asked the marshal:

"What is the source of this information which you give me with such assurance, why do you insult our army?"

The atmosphere of the meeting became as cold as ice. They all lifted their heads and looked at me while I waited for Bulganin to reply. He found himself at a tight spot because he had not expected this cutting question, and he looked at Beria.

Beria began to speak, the movements of his hands and eyes revealing his embarrassment and irritation, and said that according to their information, we allegedly had unsuitable and dubious elements, not only in the army, but also in the apparatus of the state and in the economy. He even mentioned a percentage. Bulganin sighed with relief and looked around, not concealing his satisfaction. But Beria cut short his smile. He openly opposed Bulganin's "advice" about purges and stressed that the "elements with a bad past, but who have since taken the right road, must not be purged but should be pardoned." The resentment and deep contradictions which existed between these two were displayed quite openly. As it turned out later, the contradictions between Bulganin and Beria were not simply between these two persons, but were the reflection of deep contradictions, quarrels and opposition between the Soviet State Security Service and the intelligence organs of the Soviet Army. But we were to learn these things later. In this concrete case we were dealing with a grave accusation raised against us. We could never accept this accusation, therefore, I stood up and said:

"Those who have given you this information have committed slander, hence they are enemies. There is truth in what you said. All the cadres of our army have fought in the war, have emerged from the war, and not only do I not accept these accusations but I am telling you that your informers are deceiving you, are concocting slanders. I assure you that the weapons that we have received and will receive from you have been and will be in reliable hands, that the Party of Labour, and no one else, has led and still leads our peoples army. That is all I had to say." And I sat down.

When I had finished, Malenkov began to speak to close the debate. After stressing that he agreed with what the preceding speakers had said, he issued a load of "advice and instructions" for us, and then dwelt on the debate which we had with Bulganin and Beria about the "enemies" in the ranks of our army.

"As far as undertaking purges in the army, I think that the problem should not be presented in this way," said Malenkov, opposing the "advice" which Bulganin gave me about purges. "People are not born ready-formed, and they make mistakes in life. We must not be afraid to excuse people for their past mistakes. We have people who have fought against us with weapons, but now we are bringing out special laws to pardon them for their past and in this way to give them the possibility to work in the army and even to be in the party. The term 'purge' of the army is not suitable," repeated Malenkov and closed the discussion.

Utter confusion: One said irresponsibly, "You have enemies" and "carry out purges," the other said, "We are bringing out laws to pardon them for their past."

However, these were their opinions. We listened to them carefully and openly expressed our opposition to those things over which we disagreed.

Meeting which showed that the leadership of the Soviet Union was ill-disposed towards our country.

The "changing of the guard" was taking place in the Kremlin.

My conclusion from this meeting was unpleasant. I saw that the leadership of the Soviet Union was ill-disposed towards our country. The arrogant way they behaved during the meeting, their refusal to give those few things that we sought, and their slanderous attack on the cadres of our army were not good signs.

From this meeting I observed also that there was no unity in the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Malenkov and Beria were predominant, Molotov hardly spoke, Mikoyan seemed to be on the outer and spouted venom, while what Bulganin said was bullshit.

It was apparent that the in-fighting had begun among the leaders in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However hard they tried to avoid giving the impression outside that the "changing of the guard" was taking place in the Kremlin, they were unable to hide everything. Changes had been and were being made in the party and the government. After he kicked out Malenkov, leaving him only the post of prime minister, Khrushchev made himself first secretary of the Central Committee in September 1953. It is evident that Khrushchev and his group of close cronies hatched up the intrigue in the Presidium carefully, by setting their opponents at loggerheads and eliminating Beria and apparently "taming" the others.

The version on Beria's liquidation resembles the detective films.

There are many versions about the arrest and execution of Beria. Amongst others it was said that men from the army, headed by General Moskalenko, arrested Beria right in the meeting of the Presidium of the CC of the party. Apparently Khrushchev and his henchmen charged the army with this "special mission," because they did not trust the state security, since Beria had had it in his hands for years on end. The plan had been hatched up in advance: While the meeting of the Presidium of the CC of the party was being held, Moskalenko and his men got into a nearby room unobserved. At the given moment, Malenkov pressed the bell and within a few seconds Moskalenko entered the office where the meeting was being held and approached Beria to arrest him. It was said that Beria reached out to take the satchel he had nearby, but Khrushchev, who was sitting "vigilant" by his side, was "quicker" and seized the satchel first. The "bird" could not fly away, the action was crowned with success precisely as in a detective film, but this was no ordinary film: The actors of this one were members of the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU.

This is what, was said, took place and Khrushchev himself admitted it. Later, when a general, who I believe was called Sergatskov, came to Tirana as Soviet military adviser he also told us something about the trial of Beria. He told us that he had been called as a witness to declare in court that Beria had allegedly behaved arrogantly towards him. On this occasion Sergatskov told our comrades in confidence: "Beria defended himself very strongly in the court, accepted none of the accusations and refuted them all."

Khrushchev's clownish nature in the treatment of problems.

In June 1954, a few months after Khrushchev's elevation to the post of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, together with Comrade Hysni Kapo, we had to go to Moscow where we sought a meeting with the Soviet leaders to talk about the economic problems over the solution of which they were proving uncooperative. Khrushchev received us, together with Malenkov, who was still prime minister, in the presence of Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Suslov and one or two others of lower rank.

Having mentioned that he had met Khrushchev once or twice in Ukraine before the death of Stalin, Comrade Enver Hoxha continues: Khrushchev's unexpected and rapid rise to power did not make a good impression on us. Not because we had anything against him, but because we thought that the role and figure of Khrushchev was not so well-known either in the Soviet Union or in the world, that he could so rapidly take the place of the great Stalin as first secretary of the Central Committee of the party. Khrushchev had never appeared at any of the meetings we had had for years on end with Stalin, although nearly all the top leaders of the party and Soviet state took part in most of those meetings. However, we did not express this and never mentioned our impression about this promotion of Khrushchev so high. We considered this an internal matter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, thought that they knew what they were doing, and wished with all our heart that things would always go well in the Soviet Union, as in the time of Stalin.

And now the day had come for us to meet Khrushchev face to face in our first official meeting.

I spoke first. I briefly presented the economic, political and organizational situation of the country, the situation in the party and our people's state power.

Khrushchev spoke immediately after me and right from the start displayed his clownish nature in the treatment of problems:

"We are informed about your situation and problems from the materials we have studied," he began. "The report which Comrade Enver gave us here made matters clearer to us, and I describe it as a 'joint report,' yours and ours. But," he continued, "I am still a bad Albanian and I am not going to speak now either about the economic problems or about the political ones, which Comrade Enver raised, because, for our part, we have still not exchanged opinions and reached a common view. Therefore, I am going to speak about something else."

And he began to give us a long talk about the importance of the role of the party.

He spoke in a loud voice with many gestures of his hands and his head, looking in all directions without concentrating on any one point, interrupted his speech here and there to ask questions, and then, often without waiting for the reply, went on with his speech, hopping from branch to branch.

"The party leads, organizes, controls," he theorized. "It is the initiator and inspirer. But Beria wanted to liquidate the role of the party." And after a moment of silence he asked me: "Have you received the resolution which announced the sentence we passed on Beria?"

"Yes," I replied.

He left his discourse about the party and started to speak about the activity of Beria, he accused him of almost every crime and described him as the cause of many evils. These were the first steps towards the attack on Stalin. For the time being, Khrushchev felt that he could not rise against the figure and work of Stalin, therefore, in order to prepare the terrain he started with Beria. At this meeting, moreover, to our astonishment, Khrushchev told us:

"When you were here last year, you assisted in the unmasking and exposure of Beria."

I stared in amazement, wondering what he was leading up to. Khrushchev's explanation was this:

"You remember the debate which you had last year with Bulganin and Beria over the accusation they made against your army. It was Beria who had given us that information, and the strong opposition which you put up in the presence of the comrades of the Presidium helped us by supplementing the doubts and the facts which we had about the hostile activity of Beria. A few days after your departure for Albania we condemned him."

Malenkov was the "scapegoat."

However, in that first meeting with us Khrushchev was not concerned simply with Beria. The "Beria" dossier had been closed. Khrushchev had settled accounts with him. Now he had to go further. He dealt at length with the importance and the role of the first secretary or general secretary of the party.

"To me it is of no importance whether he is called 'first' secretary or 'general' secretary," he said in substance. "What is important is that the most able, qualified person with the greatest authority in the country must be elected to that post. We have our experience," he continued. "After the death of Stalin we had four secretaries of the Central Committee but we had no one in charge, and thus we had no one to sign the minutes of meetings."

After going all round the question from the aspect of "principle," Khrushchev did not fail to launch a few gibes which, of course, were aimed against Malenkov, although he mentioned no names.

"Imagine what would occur," he said in his cunning way, "if the most capable and authoritative comrade were elected chairman of the Council of Ministers. He would have everyone on his back, and thus there would be a danger that the criticism put forward through the party would not be taken into account and hence the party would take second place and be turned into an organ of the Council of Ministers."

While he was speaking I glanced several times at Malenkov who sat motionless while his whole body seemed to be sagging, his face an ashen hue.

Voroshilov, his face flushed bright red, was watching me, waiting for Khrushchev to finish his "discourse." Then he began. He pointed out to me (as though I did not know) that the post of prime minister was very important, too, for this or that reason, etc.

"I think," said Voroshilov in an uncertain tone, as though he did not know with whom to side and whom to oppose, "that Comrade Khrushchev did not intend to imply that the Council of Ministers does not have its special importance. The prime minister, likewise..."

Now Malenkov's face had become deathly pale. While wanting to soften the bad impression which Khrushchev had created, especially about Malenkov, with these words, Voroshilov brought out more clearly the tense situation which existed in the Presidium of the CC of the party. Klim Voroshilov went on with this lecture about the role and importance of the prime minister for several minutes.

Malenkov was the "scapegoat" which they displayed to me to see how I would react. In these two lectures I saw clearly that the split in the Presidium of the CC of the CPSU was growing deeper, that Malenkov and his supporters were on the way out. We were to see later where this process would lead.

The green lights were given for all the revisionist elements in the other parties too.

At this same meeting Khrushchev told us that the other sister parties had been told of the Soviet "experience" of who should be first secretary of the party and who prime minister in the countries of people's democracy.

"We talked over these questions with the Polish comrades before the congress of their party," Khrushchev told us. "We thrashed matters out thoroughly and thought that Comrade Bierut should remain chairman of the Council of Ministers and Comrade Ochab should be appointed first secretary of the party..."

Hence, right from the start Khrushchev was for pushing Bierut aside in the leadership of the party (and later for his elimination), since he had insisted that Ochab, "a very good Polish comrade," as he stressed to us, should be elected first secretary. Thus they were giving the green light for all the revisionist elements, who, up till yesterday, were wriggling and keeping a low profile, awaiting the opportune moments. Now these moments were being created by Khrushchev who, with his actions, stands and "new ideas," was becoming the inspirer and organizer of "changes" and "reorganizations."

Bierut was completely eliminated by a sudden "cold" caught in Moscow.

However, the Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party did not fulfill Khrushchev's desires. Bierut, a resolute Marxist-Leninist comrade, of whom I have very good memories, was elected first secretary of the party, while Cyrankiewicz was elected prime minister.

Khrushchev "reconciled" himself to this decision because there was nothing he could do about it. However, the revisionist Mafia, which had begun to stir, was thinking about all the ways and possibilities. It was creating its spider's web. And although Bierut was not removed from the leadership of the party in Warsaw, as Khrushchev wanted and dictated, later he was to be eliminated completely by a "cold" caught in Moscow.

[12 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 12 Oct (ATA)--By vividly presenting the facts in his book "The Khrushchevites (Memoirs)," Comrade Enver Hoxha analyses the factors that brought about the great tragedy in the Soviet Union. He stresses the correctness of J.V. Stalin's line and the counter-revolutionary role of Khrushchev, Mikoyan, etc. He writes:

Khrushchev's Strategy and Tactics Within the Soviet Union

The roots of the tragedy of the Soviet Union. The stages through which Khrushchev passed towards seizing political and ideological power. The Khrushchevite caste corrodes the sword of the revolution. What lies behind Khrushchev's "collective leadership." Khrushchev and Mikoyan--the head of the counterrevolutionary plot. The breeze of liberalism is blowing in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev and Voroshilov speak openly against Stalin. Khrushchev builds up his own cult. The enemies of the revolution are proclaimed "heroes" and "victims."

One of the main directions of Khrushchev's strategy and tactics, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha, was to seize complete political and ideological power within the Soviet Union and to put the Soviet Army and the state security organs in his service.

The Khrushchev group would work to achieve this objective step by step. At first, it would not attack Marxism-Leninism, the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union and Stalin frontally. On the contrary, this group would base itself on the successes achieved and, moreover, would exalt them to the maximum, in order to gain credit for itself and create a situation of euphoria, with the aim of destroying the socialist base and superstructure later.

First of all, this renegade group had to get control of the party in order to eliminate the possible resistance of those cadres who had not lost their revolutionary class vigilance, to neutralize the waverers and win them over by means of persuasion or threats, as well as to promote to the key leading positions bad, anti-Marxist, careerist, opportunist elements of whom, of course, there were some in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the apparatus of the Soviet state.

After the great patriotic war some negative phenomena appeared in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The difficult economic situation, the devastation and destruction, the great human losses which occurred in the Soviet Union, required a total mobilization of the cadres and the masses for its consolidation and progress. However, instead of this, a falling-off in the character and morale of many cadres was noticed. On the other hand, through their conceit and boasting about the glory of the battles won, through their decorations and privileges, with their many vices and distorted views, the power-seeking elements were overwhelming the vigilance of the party and causing it to decay from within. A caste was created in the army which extended its despotic and arrogant domination to the party, too, altering its proletarian character. The party should have been the sword of the revolution, but this caste corroded it.

Stalin's correct line was distorted and sabotaged by the enemy elements.

Khrushchev and his collaborators acted under cover.

I am of the opinion that even before the war, but especially after the war, signs of a deplorable apathy appeared in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This party had a great reputation, and had achieved colossal successes in the course of its work, but at the same time it had started to lose the revolutionary spirit and was becoming infected by bureaucracy and routine. The Leninist norms, the teachings of Lenin and Stalin had been transformed by the apparatchiki into stale platitudes and hackneyed slogans devoid of operative worth. The Soviet Union was a vast country, the people worked, produced, created. It was said that industry was developing at the necessary rates and that the socialist agriculture was advancing. But this development was not at the level it should have been.

It was not the "wrong" line of Stalin which held up the progress. On the contrary, this line was correct and Marxist-Leninist, but it was frequently applied badly and even distorted and sabotaged by enemy elements. Stalin's correct line was distorted also by the disguised enemies in the ranks of the party and in the organs of the state, by the opportunists, liberals, Trotskyites and revisionists, as the Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Suslov, Kosygin, etc. eventually turned out to be.

Before the death of Stalin, Khrushchev and his close collaborators in the putsch were among the main leaders who acted under cover, who made preparations and awaited the appropriate moment for open action on a broad scale. It is a fact that these traitors were hardened conspirators, with the experience of various Russian counter-revolutionaries, the experience of anarchists, Trotskyites and Bukharinites. They were also acquainted with the experience of the revolution and the Bolshevik Party, although they learned nothing of benefit from the revolution, but learned everything they needed to undermine the revolution and socialism, while escaping the blows of the revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In short, they were counter-revolutionaries and double-dealers. On the one hand, they sang the praises of socialism, the revolution, the Bolshevik Communist Party, Lenin and Stalin, and on the other hand, they prepared the counter-revolution.

Hence, all this accumulated scum carried out sabotage with the subtlest methods, which they disguised by praising Stalin and the socialist regime. These elements disorganized the revolution while organizing the counter-revolution, displayed "severity" against internal enemies in order to spread fear and terror in the party, the state and the people. It was they who created a situation full of euphoria which they reported to Stalin, but in reality they destroyed the base of the party, the base of the state, caused spiritual degeneration and built up the cult of Stalin to the skies in order to overthrow him more easily in the future.

This was a diabolical hostile activity which had a stranglehold on the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Stalin, who, as the historical facts showed, was surrounded by enemies. Almost none of the members of the Presidium and the Central Committee raised their voices in defence of socialism and Stalin.

If a detailed analysis is made of the political, ideological and organizational directives of Stalin in the leadership and organization of the party, the war and the work, in general, mistakes of principle will not be found. But if we bear in mind how they were distorted by the enemies and applied in practice, we will see the dangerous consequences of these distortions and it will become obvious why the party began to become bureaucratic, to be immersed in routine work and dangerous formalism which sapped its strength and strangled its revolutionary spirit and enthusiasm. The party became covered by a heavy layer of rust, by political apathy, thinking mistakenly that the head, the leadership, operates and solves everything on its own. From such a concept the situation was created that in every instance and about everything they would say, "this is the leadership's business." "The Central Committee does not make mistakes." "Stalin has said this, and that's all there is to it," etc. Stalin might not have said many things, but they were covered with his name.

The apparatus and the officials became "omnipotent," "infallible" and operated in bureaucratic ways under the slogans of democratic centralism and Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism, which were no longer Bolshevik in reality. There is no doubt that in this way the Bolshevik Party lost its former vitality. It lived on with correct slogans, but they were only slogans. It carried out orders, but did not act on its own initiative. With the methods and forms of work which were used in the leadership of the party, the opposite results were achieved.

A worker aristocracy made up of bureaucratic cadres was being created in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

In such conditions bureaucratic administrative measures began to predominate over revolutionary measures. Vigilance was no longer operative because it was no longer revolutionary, regardless of all the boasting about it. From a vigilance of the party and the masses, it was being turned into a vigilance of bureaucratic apparatus and transformed, in fact, if not completely from the formal viewpoint, into a vigilance of the state security organs and the courts.

It is understandable that in such conditions, non-proletarian, non-working class feelings and views began to take root and to be cultivated in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in the consciousness of many of the communists, careerism, servility, charlatanism, unhealthy cronyism, anti-proletarian morality, etc. began to spread. These evils eroded the party from within, smothered the feeling of class struggle and sacrifice and encouraged seeking the "good life," with comforts, with privileges, with personal gains and the least possible work and effort. Thus, a worker aristocracy made up of bureaucratic cadres was being created in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Regrettably, such a process of degeneration developed under the "joyful" and "hopeful" slogans that "everything is going well, normally, within the laws and norms of the party," which in fact were being violated, that "the class struggle is still being waged," that "democratic centralism is safeguarded," "criticism and self-criticism continues as before," that "there is steel unity in the party," "there are no more factional, anti-party elements," "the time of Trotskyite and Bukharinite groups is passed," etc, etc. Generally speaking, even the revolutionary elements considered such a distorted concept of the situation to be a [word indistinct] reality and, this is the essence of the drama and the fatal mistake.

Therefore, it was considered that there was nothing to be alarmed about. Hence, according to them, life was proceeding normally, and thus it was reported to Stalin: "Everything is going normally." We are convinced that if Stalin, as the great revolutionary he was, had known the reality of the situation in the party, he would have struck a crushing blow at this unhealthy spirit and the entire party and the Soviet people would have risen to their feet to support him because, quite correctly, they had great trust in Stalin.

Not only did the apparatuses misinform Stalin and bureaucratically deform his correct directives, but they had created such a situation among the people and in the party that even when Stalin went among the masses of the party and the people, to the extent that his age and health permitted, they did not inform him about the shortcomings and mistakes which were occurring, because the apparatus had implanted the opinion amongst the communists and the masses that "we must not worry Stalin."

The great hullabaloo the Khrushchevites made about the so-called cult of Stalin was a bluff.

The great hullabaloo the Khrushchevites made about the so-called cult of Stalin, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha further on, was really only a bluff. It was not Stalin, who was a modest person, who had built up this cult, but all the revisionist scum accumulated at the head of the party and the state which apart from anything else, exploited the great love of the Soviet peoples for Stalin, especially after the victory over fascism. If one reads the speeches of Khrushchev, Mikoyan and all the other members of the Presidium, one will see what unrestrained and hypocritical praises these enemies poured on Stalin as long as he was alive. It is sickening to read these things when you think that behind all this praise they were hiding their hostile work from the communists and the masses who were deceived, thinking that they had to do with leaders loyal to Marxism-Leninism and comrades loyal to Stalin.

Even for some time after Stalin's death, the "new" Soviet leaders, and Khrushchev above all, still did not speak badly about him. Indeed they described him as a "great man," a "leader of indisputable authority," etc. Khrushchev had to speak in this way to gain credit inside and outside the Soviet Union in order to create the idea that he was "loyal" to socialism and the revolution, a "continuer" of the work of Lenin and Stalin.

Khrushchev and Mikoyan were the bitterest enemies of Marxism-Leninism and Stalin. These two headed the plot and the putsch which they had prepared long before, together with anti-Marxist, careerist elements of the Central Committee, of the army, and leaders at the base. These putschists did not show their hand immediately after the death of Stalin, but, when it was necessary and to the extent it was necessary, continued to administer the poison along with their praises for Stalin. It is true that Mikoyan, in particular, in the many meetings I have had with him, never boasted Stalin, irrespective of the fact that in speeches and discourses the putschists heaped praises and glory on Stalin on every occasion. They fostered the cult of Stalin in order to isolate him as much as possible from the masses, and, hiding behind this cult, they prepared the catastrophe.

Khrushchev and Mikoyan worked to a plan and after the death of Stalin found an open field for their activity, also because of the fact that Malenkov, Beria,

Bulganin and Voroshilov proved to be not only blind, but also ambitious, and each of them struggled for power.

They and others, old revolutionaries and honest communists, had now turned into typical representatives of that bureaucratic routine, of that bureaucracy which developed, and, when they made a feeble attempt to use this against the obvious plot of the Khrushchevites, it was already too late.

Khrushchev and Milovan, in complete unity, knew how to manoeuvre amongst them and to set one against the other. In a few words, they applied this tactic: Split and divide in the Presidium, organize the forces of the putsch outside, continue to speak well about Stalin in order to have the millions strong masses on their side, and thus bring closer the day of the seizure of power, the liquidation of opponents, and of a whole glorious epoch of the construction of socialism, the victory of the patriotic war, etc. All this feverish activity (and we sensed this) was aimed to create the popularity of Khrushchev inside the Soviet Union and outside it.

Under the umbrella of the victories which the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had scored under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, Khrushchev did his utmost to make the Soviet peoples and the Soviet communists think that nothing had changed, one great leader had died, but a "greater" leader was rising, and what a leader he was. As principled a Leninist as the former, if not more so, but liberal, popular, smiling, all humour and jokes.

Revisionist viper pours out its poison about the figure and work of Stalin.

Meanwhile the revisionist viper, which was becoming active, started to pour out its poison about the figure and work of Stalin. At first this was done without attacking Stalin by name, but attacking him indirectly.

In one of the meetings which I had with Khrushchev, in June 1954, in an allegedly principled and theoretical way he began to expound to me the great importance of "collective leadership," and the great damage which comes about when this leadership is replaced by the cult of one person, and mentioned isolated excerpts from Marx and Lenin, so that I would think that what he was saying had a Marxist-Leninist basis.

He said nothing against Stalin, but he fired off all his batteries at Beria, accusing him of real and non-existent crimes. The truth is that in this initial stage of Khrushchev's revisionist assault, Beria was the appropriate card to play to advance the secret plans. On the pretext of the struggle against the damage caused by Beria, Khrushchev, on the one hand, established himself in the leadership of the party and state and took control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and on the other hand prepared public opinion for the open attack which he was to undertake later on Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, and on the real work of the Bolshevik Communist Party of Lenin and Stalin.

Many of these surprising actions and changes made an impression on us, but it was too early to be able to grasp the true proportions of the plot which was being carried out. Nevertheless, even at that time we could not fail to notice the

contradictory nature of various actions and opinions of this "new leader" who was taking over the reins in the Soviet Union. This same Khrushchev who was now parading before us as a "disciple of collective leadership" a few days earlier in a meeting which we had with him, when he spoke to us about the role of the first secretary of the party and the prime minister, presented himself as an ardent supporter of the "role of the individual" and the "firm hand."

After Stalin's death it seemed that an allegedly collective leadership was established by these "adherents to principle." The collective leadership was publicized to show that "Stalin had violated the principle of collective leadership," that he "had degraded this important norm for Leninist leadership," and that the "leadership of the party and the state had been transformed from collective leadership into individual leadership." This was a big lie, publicized by the Khrushchevites to prepare the ground for themselves. If the collective leadership principle had been violated, the blame for this must be laid not on the correct ideas which Stalin expressed on different problems, but on the hypocritical flattery of those others and on the arbitrary decisions which they themselves took, distorting the line in the various sectors which they led.

In the campaign allegedly for the establishment of the collective leadership Khrushchev was trying to perform a slight-of-hand trick, under cover of a deafening clamour about the struggle against the cult of the individual. There were no more photographs of Khrushchev on the daily press, no more big headlines boosting him, but another stale tactic was used: all the newspapers were filled with his public speeches, his discourses, reports about his meetings with foreign ambassadors, his nightly attendances at diplomatic receptions, his meetings with delegations of communist parties, his meetings with American journalists, businessmen and senators and Western millionaires, who were friends of Khrushchev.

Khrushchev's and Voroshilov's slanderous tale.

I was in Moscow on the occasion of a meeting of the parties of all the socialist countries. I think it was January 1956, when a consultative meeting was held about the problems of economic development of the member countries of COMECON. It was the time when Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites were advancing in their hostile activity. We were together with Khrushchev and Voroshilov in a villa outside Moscow, where all the representatives of the sister parties were to have lunch. The others had not yet arrived. I had never heard the Soviet leaders openly speak ill of Stalin, and I, for my part, continued as before to speak with affection and deep respect for the great Stalin. Apparently these words of mine did not sound sweet in Khrushchev's ears. While waiting for the other comrades to come, Khrushchev and Voroshilov said to me:

"Shall we take some air in the park?"

We went out and strolled around the paths of the park. Khrushchev said to Klim Voroshilov:

"Do tell Enver something about Stalin's mistakes."

I pricked up my ears, although I had long suspected that they were crooks. And Voroshilov began to tell me that "Stalin made mistakes in the line of the party, he was brutal, and so savage that you could not discuss anything with him."

Voroshilov went on, "He even allowed crimes to be committed, and he must bear responsibility for this. He made mistakes also in the field of the development of the economy, therefore it is not right to describe him as the 'architect of the construction of socialism'. Stalin did not have correct relations with the other parties..."

Voroshilov went on and on pouring out such things against Stalin. Some I understood and some I didn't, because, as I have written above, I did not understand Russian well, but nevertheless I understood the essence of the conversation and the aim of these two and I was revolted. Khrushchev was walking ahead of us, carrying a stick with which he hit the cabbages that they had planted in the park. (Khrushchev had planted vegetables even in the parks in order to pose as an expert in agriculture.)

As soon as Voroshilov ended his slanderous tale I asked him:

"How is it possible that Stalin could make such mistakes?"

Khrushchev turned to me, his face flushed, and replied.

"It is possible, it is possible Comrade Enver, Stalin did these things."

"You have seen these things when Stalin was alive. But how is it that you did not help him to avoid these mistakes, which you say he made?" I asked Khrushchev.

"It is natural that you ask this question, Comrade Enver, but you see this kapust (cabbage Russian in the original). Here Stalin would have cut off your head just as easily as the gardener will cut this kapusta," and Khrushchev hit the cabbage with his stick.

"Everything is clear." I said to Khrushchev and said no more.

We went inside. The other comrades had arrived. I was seething with anger.

Unrestrained demagoguery and efforts to build up the cult of charlatan, clown and blackmailer of Khrushchev.

Khrushchev was advancing more rapidly towards the seizure of power, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha further on. He was creating the figure of a "popular" Moujik leader, who was opening the prisons and concentration camps, who not only did not fear the reactionaries and the condemned enemies in the prisons in the Soviet Union, but by releasing them, wanted to show they had been condemned even when they were "innocent."

Everyone knows what Trotskyites, conspirators and counter-revolutionaries Zinoviev, Kameniev, Rykov, and Pyatokov were, what traitors Tukhachevsky and the other generals, agents of intelligence service or the Germans, were. But to Khrushchev and Mikoyan they were all fine people and a little later, in February 1956, they were to present them as innocent victims of the "Stalinist terror." This was being built up slowly, public opinion was being carefully prepared. The "new" leaders, who were the same as in the past, with the exception of Stalin, were posing as liberals in order to say to the people: "Breathe freely, you are free,

you are in genuine democracy because the tyrant and the tyranny have been eliminated. Now everything is proceeding on Lenin's road. Plenty has been created. The markets will be so full that we won't know what to do with all the products."

Khrushchev, this disgusting, loud-mouthed individual, concealed his wiles and manoeuvres under a torrent of empty words. Nevertheless, in this way he created a situation favourable to his group. Khrushchev let no day go by without indulging in unrestrained demagoguery about the development of agriculture, transferring people and changing methods of work and making himself the only "competent boss" of agriculture, the one who undertook such personal "reforms."

Khrushchev had even "inaugurated" his elevation to the post of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with a long report on the problems of agriculture, which he delivered at a plenum of the Central Committee in September 1953. This report, which was described as "very important," contained those Khrushchevite ideas and reforms which, in fact, damaged Soviet agriculture so severely that their catastrophic consequences are being felt to this day. All the boastful clamour about the "virgin lands" was empty advertising. The Soviet Union has bought and is still buying millions of tons of grain from the United States of America.

However, the "collective leadership" and non-publication of Khrushchev's photographs in the newspapers did not last long. The cult of Khrushchev was being built up by the tricksters, the liberals, the careerists, the lick-spittles and the flatterers. The great authority of Stalin, based on his immortal work, was undermined inside and outside the Soviet Union. His place and authority was usurped by that charlatan, clown and blackmailer.

[13 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 13 Oct (ATA)--In continuation of the book "The Khrushchevites (Memoirs)," Comrade Enver Hoxha describes the difficult talks on economic matters with the new Soviet leaders and their stand of hucksters in the relations with Albania. He discovers the efforts of the Khrushchevites to hinder the development of Albanian economy.

In continuation of the book "The Khrushchevites (Memoirs)," Comrade Enver Hoxha describes the difficult talks on economic matters with the new Soviet leaders and their stand of hucksters in the relations with Albania. He discovers the efforts of the Khrushchevites to hinder the development of Albanian economy.

Comrade Enver Hoxha also points out the discontent and quarrels among the revisionist chiefs in COMECON.

Not Marxist-Leninists but Hucksters

Mikoyan, a cosmopolitan huckster and inveterate anti-Albanian. Difficult talks in June 1953 on economic matters--the Soviet leaders are bargaining over aid for Albania. Khrushchev's "advice" one year later: "You don't need heavy industry," "We shall supply you with oil and metals," "Don't worry about bread grain, we'll supply you with all you want." Quarrels with Mikoyan. Discontent in COMECON from the revisionist chiefs. Ochab, Dej, Ulbricht. The June 1956 COMECON consultation in Moscow--Khrushchev: "...we must do what Hitler did." With Khrushchev again. His "advice:" "Albania should advance with cotton, sheep, fish and citrus fruit."

We were determined to carry on and develop even further the practice, which was begun at the time when Stalin was alive, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha, of exchanging opinions with and seeking the aid of the Soviet leadership over our economic problems. We felt the need for continual consultation with our friends, and first of all with the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Likewise we felt the need for some material aid and credits from them. These we never considered as charity and never sought them as such.

However, in this field of our relations and contacts with the post-Stalin Soviet leadership, too, we very soon saw the first sign that things were no longer going as before. There was something wrong, there was no longer that former atmosphere, when we would go to Stalin and open our hearts to him without hesitation and he would listen and speak to us just as frankly from his heart, the heart of an internationalist communist. More and more each day, in his successors, instead of communists we saw hucksters.

To Mikoyan, Albania was a "geographical notion."

Mikoyan, in particular, was the most negative, the most dubious element and the greatest intriguer among the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This huckster, who was constantly grinding and clicking his false teeth, was also ruminating on diabolical anti-Marxist, conspiratorial, putschist plans, as was proved later. This individual, with an unpleasant face and a black heart, behaved in a very menacing way, especially towards us Albanians. Our relations with this tight-fisted dealer and money-changer were economic and commercial. Everything in connection with Albania, both in according credits, and in commercial exchanges, this individual looked at simply from the angle of a trader. The friendly, internationalist socialist feelings had been wiped out as far as he was concerned.

To Mikoyan, Albania was a "geographical notion," a country with a people of no value. I never heard him say one word about our war, our people, or the efforts we made in the struggle with the great difficulties for the revival of the country and our economy ruined by the war. He who had visited nearly every country, never once said that he would like to come to Albania. It seemed that the Soviet leadership based itself on the "great economic experience" of this cosmopolitan huckster, who, as history showed, plotted with Nikita Khrushchev against Stalin, whom they had decided to murder. He admitted this with his own mouth to Mehmet and me in February 1960. After the putsch they linked up with American imperialism, and set about the destruction to its foundations of the great work of Lenin and Stalin, socialism in the Soviet Union. It was Mikoyan who decided what aid the Soviet Union would provide for Albania, as for the other countries.

In relations with us Mikoyan was not only the most miserly but also the most insulting. This anti-Albanian line of his was permanent, even when Stalin was alive.

With all our economic delegations Mikoyan behaved like the hard-faced trader he was.

After the death of Stalin the anti-Albanian nuances in the attitude of the wheeler-dealer minister of the Soviet Union became a permanent line. However, now he was no longer on his own. His pencil, which always tended rather to mark crosses and write "no's" to our modest requests, now found backing and support among the others. I have spoken above about the meeting in June 1953 with Malenkov, Beria,

Mikoyan, and others in Moscow. Apart from other things, from the way they behaved towards us and how they handled the economic problems which we raised, I felt that now it was not only the body of the unforgettable Stalin that was missing in the Kremlin, but also his generous humane spirit, his attentive, friendly behaviour and his outstanding Marxist-Leninist thought.

Ill-intentioned stands.

Describing in detail the difficult talks with the Soviet leaders in June 1953 on economic matters, Comrade Enver Hoxha mentions also these words by Mikoyan:

"You are building a hydro-power station in Mat. We ask you: Where are you going to use the electric power? We do not see where you will use it. You have no need for so much electric power."

His reasoning seemed very astonishing to me, and I objected, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha.

"When it is finished, the hydro-power station on the Mat River will provide about 25,000 kw. Does this seem a large and unnecessary amount to you? Bear in mind, Comrade Mikoyan, not only that we need electric power just now, but also that the planned development of our economy in the future cannot be guaranteed without taking timely measures to ensure the necessary supply of electric power."

"The hydro-power station is costing you an enormous amount and you won't know what to do with the current," he persisted. "Likewise you have planned to build unnecessary factories, like those for steel, timber-processing, paper, glass, linseed, bread, etc. Does Albania need all these factories? Why are you building the refinery? (this refers to the oil refinery which was going up in Cerrik at that time). Have you enough oil or will you build this refinery to have it lie idle? Have a good look at these things and remove what is unnecessary. The question of agriculture is very critical, therefore reduce your investments in industry and strengthen agriculture."

I listened to him saying this, continues Comrade Enver Hoxha, and for a moment it seemed to me that I was facing not a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet deputy prime minister, but Kidric, Tito's envoy, who with his associates, 7 to 8 years earlier, had done everything possible to convince us to abandon industry and not set up any industrial project. "Agriculture, agriculture," insisted the men of Belgrade. "Agriculture, only agriculture," I was hearing them advise me now, in Moscow in 1953...

This whole meeting, which set out to examine our economic problems, continued in this spirit to the end.

A few days later, we sat down again with Mikoyan and one or two other Soviet officials and again "thrashed out" the economic problems. Seeing the unhelpful pre-disposition of the friends, we ourselves cancelled many of our requests.

Although the least that could be said about our impressions from this trip to the Soviet Union is that they were not good. Still we continued to preserve our feelings of friendship with and love for the great land of the Soviets, for the

homeland of Lenin and Stalin. Those things in their actions and gestures which had an unpleasant sound to us we kept strictly to ourselves, discussed them anxiously with one another, but in our hearts we did not want things there to take a wrong direction. We said to one another that the Soviet comrades themselves had great economic difficulties in their own country, the loss of [figure indistinct] undoubtedly confused them a little, it was not so easy for them to take over the work of leadership completely, and we ardently hoped that these would be transient manifestations that would be put right in time.

A few months later, however, we again experienced something unpleasant and not correct on their part.

Disdainful and insulting tone of the new Soviet leadership.

On 22 December 1953, we sent the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union a long letter in which, after speaking about the measures we had taken for the strengthening of the people's power, our economic development, the improvement of life in the village and the progress of agriculture, we also presented a series of problems for consultation and some modest requests for aid and credits for our coming five-year plan. We had drafted this letter according to their instructions, based on an extensive study we had carried out over several months and our opinion was that its requests were very well founded and accurate.

The Soviet specialists and advisers who had come to our country in the framework of the aid and collaboration between our two countries were of the same opinion.

No more than 5 to 6 days after we sent our letter to Moscow, the reply of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union arrived in Tirana. The whole letter consisted of 15 or 20 lines. "You have not presented the situation well," "you have viewed the situation hastily," "you have not gone into things deeply," "you have not taken the necessary measures," "prepare the plan better and write to us again." This was the entire content of those few lines signed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The disdainful and insulting tone of the new Soviet leadership could not fail to hurt us. We could not fail to ask in astonishment: "How can those people in Moscow know whether we have presented our problems rightly or wrongly, when it is we who live and work in Albania and not they?"

However, the earlier meetings, especially with Mikoyan, had already taught us what should be done to make our letter pleasing to the Soviets: we cut out many of the requests we had presented, removed from the draft of the future plan some of the things we had envisaged and proposed, especially in the field of industry, and sent a second "edited," or more accurately, mutilated letter. We were not mistaken: they informed us they were awaiting us in Moscow to "consult with and help us."

As to the opinions and "directions" which he gave us for the development of our economy, we could not agree with Khrushchev at all.

We held the first meeting with the Soviet leaders on 8 June 1954. It was precisely that meeting at which Khrushchev did not want to speak about our economic problems, since he was still "a bad Albanian," as he told us, but gave us a lecture about the role of the first secretary of the party and the prime minister.

Nevertheless, at the end of his lecture, Khrushchev also spoke about economic problems, in general, allegedly in the form of orientation and advice, especially about the line we should follow in our economic policy.

"In the development of your economy," he said, "you must be careful with your calculations. Let us take oil, for example. Is it in your interest to invest so much for oil? he asked.

I understood immediately what he was getting at. Despite the "instructions" that they had given us previously that we should give up prospecting for and extraction of oil in Albania, in the second letter which we sent them, we persisted in our opinions and asked them to assist us in this sector. Now, since he raised the matter, I took the opportunity to put forward our opinion once again.

Then Comrade Enver Hoxha dwells on the reasons he presented to Khrushchev concerning the prospecting and extraction of oil.

"Very well, very well," said Khrushchev, "the thing is that calculations must be made well, in detail and you must see whether it is worthwhile."

After giving me a good lecture with figures about the "profitability" and "non-profitability" of the extraction of oil, with the aim that I "should not make mistakes" like Stalin, Khrushchev came round to the point:

"Hence we must make our reckoning on economic questions very carefully, both in our country and in yours, and if you have profitable sources of oil, fine, we give you credits. However, reckoning things this way, it turns out that it is more profitable for us to supply you from our oil...

"We must have regard for profitability in everything," continued Khrushchev. "Let us take industry. I am of the same opinion as you that Albania should have its own industry. But what sort of industry? I think that you ought to develop the food industry, such as preserving and processing fish, fruit, vegetable oil, etc. You want to develop heavy industry, too. This should be looked at carefully," he said and after mentioning that we could set up some engineering plant for repair work and spare parts, he added:

"As for the mineral-processing industry, for the production of metals, this is unprofitable for you. We have metals and we can supply you with what you want. If we give you one day's production from our industry, your needs will be fulfilled for the whole year."

"Likewise in agriculture. In Albania, too, those crops which do best and yield the greatest production, such as cotton, citrus fruit, olives, etc., should be developed. In this way Albania will become a beautiful garden and we will fulfill each other's needs."

"One of the main directions of the development of agriculture in our country," I said, "is that of increasing bread grain production. Bread has always been and still is a great problem for us."

"Don't worry about growing bread grain," interjected Khrushchev immediately. "We shall supply you with all the wheat you want, because even one day's overfulfillment of the plan in the Soviet Union is sufficient for Albania to live on for 3 years. We are advancing rapidly in agriculture," he continues. "Let me read you some of the statistics about the fulfillment of the plan of the spring sowing in our country: the planting has been fulfilled...percent...hectares of land more than last year have been planted...million hectares above the plan...." And he went on to stuff us with figures, which he rattled off, one after the other, to give us the impression that we were dealing not with any sort of leader, but with one that had the situation at his fingertips.

As for his figures, we had no reason to doubt their accuracy, therefore we were pleased and wished the Soviet Union the greatest possible progress. As to the opinions and "directions" which he gave us for the development of our economy, however, we could not agree with Khrushchev at all. I do not want to say that as early as this first official meeting with him, in June 1954, we managed to realize that we were facing the future chief of modern revisionism. No, we were to realize this later, but at this meeting we noticed that his ideas, both about oil and the orientation of industry and agriculture in our country, were not correct, did not respond to the needs of our country, and were not compatible with the basic principles of the construction of socialism in a country or with the teachings and experience of Lenin and Stalin. Therefore, we decided to oppose his ideas and defend our own views.

At this meeting, however, Khrushchev left no room for debate.

"I expressed these opinions so that you will bear them in mind," he said in conclusion. "As to the discussion of the concrete questions you raised here in connection with the development of your economy, for our part we have appointed a group of comrades headed by Mikoyan. Finally, we shall meet again and make the decision jointly."

[14 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 14 Oct (ATA)--Limited credits, arrogant criticism with lashings of "advice."

For several days on end, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha, we battled with Mikoyan, who now set to work with his pruning shears. In order to reject our requests for the development of industry, which were modest enough, but on which we insisted, he and his comrades, as usual, repeated the same old refrain:

"Why do you need industry? Don't you see the state of your countryside?"

Naturally we knew the situation in our countryside much better than they, knew the backwardness of our agriculture inherited from the past, and precisely because we knew these things well we had always devoted special attention to the progress of agriculture and to the raising of the standard of living in the countryside. But you can't achieve everything overnight. Moreover, we were well aware of the Marxist-Leninist truth, and we felt it in our daily practice, that agriculture could never advance without the development of industry, without the creation and strengthening of those basic branches which would favour the harmonious development of the whole of our people's economy. Therefore in these meetings with the Soviet leaders we stuck to our opinions and persisted in our requests.

"Despite all the progress it has made," we told them among other things, "today our industry produces only a limited range of products and is quite unable to fulfil the needs of the working people. In many cases, too, securing our products depends on the delivery of many goods from abroad, such as fuel, steel, rolled steel, tyres, chemicals, chemical fertilizers, spare parts, instruments and many other things.

"The Central Committee of the party and our government think that the existing situation cannot be altered, except by developing industry along with agriculture, the industry which, step by step, will relieve us of that great burden of imports, which we are obliged to cope with at present," we told them.

In the end Mikoyan and his group gave way.

"All right," he said, "we shall refer those things on which we have not reached agreement to the leadership and decide on them jointly at the final meeting."

At the final meeting of this visit, which was held 2 or 3 days before we left for Albania, Khrushchev's behaviour was more friendly and more open. After our insistence on those things we were seeking (undoubtedly Mikoyan had informed him of the debates we had had), Khrushchev showed himself "more generous," repeated several times, "We will assist little Albania," and agreed that some of our requests for credits and aid would be fulfilled.

At this meeting he spoke well about our party, the Central Committee and me, and as usual, was unsparing in his "boastful promises." We were soon to understand why he acted like that: It was still the beginning of the elevation of him and his group and for this he needed popularity, good opinion, the idea within the Soviet Union and abroad that we had to do with a jolly good fellow, a warm-hearted, skillful and wise leader, who knows how to put up opposition, but can also back down, who is not tight-fisted, but prudent and a consummate accountant.

Thus, it was the time when Khrushchev was "making investments" in favour of his secret action, and to this end, according to the occasion, he had to appear "generous," "friendly" and "humane." However, behind this fine, "friendly" facade, the guard of the Mikoyans and other functionaries of commerce was extremely active, and both with us and with others, they behaved like real hucksters in the talks over economic problems. They were Khrushchev's men who, with his knowledge and on his instructions, employed all kinds of pressure and trickery during "working meetings" and "the concrete examination of matters" to prune our requests and to "smooth" matters over in such a way that when we finally met Khrushchev all that remained for him to do was to smile, flatter and propose toasts.

Once we had a bitter wrangle with Mikoyan in connection with granting us a credit for mass consumer goods. There is no need here to dwell on what a grave situation we had during those years for such goods, or on the urgent needs which our country had in this direction. The Soviet leadership was aware of the situation. But, in support of our request for the credit I mentioned, we had written it a letter in which we gave a brief outline of how we fulfilled the needs of the population. However, before beginning the examination of our request, Mikoyan levelled the following charge against us:

"You are using up the credits we have granted you for the development of the economy in other sectors. You buy mass consumer goods with them."

I replied: "We have had and still have very great needs for consumer goods, but I am not aware of what you charge us with. We have never permitted the credit for the development of industry or agriculture to be used to purchase commodities."

"Yes, you have," repeated Mikoyan. "You have used up...million rubles," and he mentioned a figure which I don't remember precisely, but which amounted to more than 10 million.

"I'm hearing this for the first time," I said, "nevertheless we shall look into the matter."

"I shall convince you," said Mikoyan in a stern and angry tone and ordered one of the nearby functionaries to bring in the documents.

A little later he came in, looking pale, and laid the accounts before Mikoyan.

"There is no violation," he said. "The Albanian side has bought the goods you mentioned with the credit which our side accorded it precisely for consumer goods."

Mikoyan, in a tight spot, muttered something between his teeth, and then, in connection with our request for a new credit for the purchase of consumer goods, he replied:

"We can no longer give you such credits because we make deals over these things: you give us something, we give you something in return."

"What else do you want us to give you?" I replied. "We supply you and the countries of people's democracy with the chrome, oil and copper we extract. Do you expect us to give you the bread from the mouths of our people, who still have insufficient food? I do not consider your reasoning in order," I told the Armenian, "and I ask you to re-examine the matter."

They did re-examine it, but they accepted our requests after making big cuts. They gave us some limited credits, but they gave us arrogant criticism wholesale with lashings of "advice."

Sincerity, the genuine internationalist spirit was lacking among the COMECON countries.

All these stands, and others like these, in our relations with them, continued up to the time of the meeting of the 81 parties, which was held in Moscow in November 1960.

During this time we had many bilateral meetings with the Soviet leaders, at which we discussed economic problems with them and sought some aid and credits, and we also had many contacts with them in the meetings, talks and consultations which were organized in the framework of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid.

The way in which these meetings were organized and our friends behaved towards us, towards the problems we raised and the difficulties we had, more and more impelled us to ask ourselves, are we dealing with Marxist-Leninists or hucksters? Ulbricht, Nomotny, Ochab, Dej, Kadar, Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Zhivkov, and the others were at one another's throats. Each of them complained that he was in dire straits, they all called for "more aid" from their friends, because they had "pressure from below," they tried to elbow one another out, presented all kinds of "arguments" and figures, they tried to dodge their obligations and to grab as much as possible at the expense of others. Meanwhile Khrushchev or his envoys would get up, deliver lectures on the "socialist division of labour," support one or the other, according to their own interests in a given situation, and demand "unity" and "understanding" in the "socialist family." And in all this wrangling Albania went almost unmentioned, as if it did not exist for them.

The talks and consultations went on for 2, 3 or 4 days on end, whole dossiers were filled with speeches, requests, decisions, balances, but socialist Albania was treated with disdain by the others as if we were a nuisance. We were well aware of the situation in our country, were conscious that our economic potential was nowhere near that of the other countries, we knew also that these countries had their own big problems and difficulties, but these should never have served as a reason for them to underrate and ignore us. With great efforts, after many meetings and talks, we managed occasionally to squeeze some aid or credit out of them. We thanked them wholeheartedly for what they gave us, thanked the fraternal peoples, first of all, and for our part, not only did we fully repay the credits on time, but with what we had, we honestly fulfilled every other obligation of ours towards our friends. It was precisely sincerity, the genuine internationalist spirit, that was lacking amongst them. When it came to practical fulfillment of their commitments to provide aid for our country, each of them would make excuses:

"We have shortages and needs ourselves," said Ulbricht, "we have pressure from Federal Germany, therefore we are unable to help Albania."

"The counter-revolution caused us damage," was Kadar's justification. "Cannot fulfill our commitment about aid."

All of them, one after the other, acted in this way. And in the end the "solution" was found:

"The Council of Mutual Economic Aid recommends to the Albanian comrades that the problems raised by them here should be solved with the Soviet Government through bilateral meetings."

Contradictions in the COMECON. The "demons" which Khrushchev released from the bottle were stirring and poking out their tongues to their liberator. Khrushchev waves the whip of bread.

Among many such meetings of the COMECON countries, the one that was held in Moscow in June 1956 has stuck in my mind. Now Khrushchev was going headlong down his road of betrayal, but the others, too, were galloping after him.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU, about which I shall speak later, was having its effect. Lack of unity, division and contradictions are the natural outcome and concomitants of revisionism.

This was apparent at this meeting, 3 or 4 months after the 20th Congress.

Ochab, who had become first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, got up and declared:

"We have not fulfilled the obligations with which we have been charged for coal and are not going to do so. We cannot fulfill the plan, its targets are set too high and must be reduced. The coal workers live badly, they work to exhaustion."

As soon as he finished, Gero, Ulbricht and Dej got up, one after the other, and levelled every kind of charge against the Poles. The atmosphere was very heated.

"If you want coking coal, invest in Poland," replied Ochab. "We must improve the standard of living. Things have reached such a state that the Polish workers are about to go on strike and abandon the mines...."

"Where should we invest first?" replied the others. "In the steel plants of the Soviet Union or in your coal mines?"

"We must examine these things," said Khrushchev, trying to cool the tempers.

"As for the question of workers, if you Poles have insufficient, or those you have walk out, we can bring workers from other countries."

At this Ochab jumped up.

"It is not fair," he shouted, "you must help us. We are not going back to Poland without settling this matter. Either reduce the plan or increase the investment..."

"Once taken, the decisions must be carried out," interposed Dej.

"The decisions are not being carried out," said Gero, adding fuel to the flames. "We have several factories in which we have been told to produce arms and special equipment, but no one is buying the products from us."

"They don't take them from us, either," said Ochab, jumping up again. "What are we to do with them?"

"Let us not speak here like factory managers," said Khrushchev to Ochab. "Things can't be discussed in this way. You must look at the profitability. We, too, have changed direction in many plants. For example," continued Khrushchev, "we have turned some arms plants into plants producing water pumps. I have some suggestions about these problems," continued Khrushchev, and he began to bring out those "gems" which he had on the tip of his tongue:

"In regard to a number of special products of industry," he said among other things, "we must do as Hitler did. At that time Germany was alone and he produced all those things. We must study this experience and we, too, must set up joint enterprises for special products, for example, weapons."

We could not believe our ears. Could it be true that the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union wanted to learn from the experience of Hitler and even recommended it to others? But this is what things were coming to. The others listened and nodded approval.

"You must provide us with designs," said Ochab.

"You don't deserve to get them," shouted Khrushchev angrily, "because the West steals them from you. We gave you the patent of an aircraft and the capitalists stole it from you."

"That occurred," admitted Ochab, and pulled in his horns a little.

"We gave you the secret report of the 20th Congress and you printed it and sold it at 20 zloty a copy. You don't know how to keep secrets."

"Right," whispered Ochab, and drew in his horns even further.

"We have given you another four top secret documents and they have flown from you," added Bulganin, numbering them off one by one to his face.

"Yes," said Ochab, and now his voice could hardly be heard. "Someone stole them from us and fled to the West."

"The situation in Poland is not good," continued Khrushchev. "You are following an opportunist policy towards the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, let alone within your own country."

"In the context of collaboration," interjected Ulbricht, "we must collaborate with all, especially with the Social-Democrats."

For a moment Khrushchev was at a loss for words. "Collaboration with all," rehabilitations, a gentle policy towards enemies, were his ideas, the continuation of his opportunist and pacifist policy, the very policy which he was following in the Soviet Union. The others were not lagging behind, indeed, some of them were trying to outstrip him.

"Agreed, collaboration," shouted Khrushchev, "but not to rise against the Soviet Union and our camp. This is what is happening in Poland." He turned to Ochab and Cyrankiewicz, who during the whole time had sat smoking French gauloises, without saying a single word. "You must improve the situation. You must build up the people's trust in you."

"We have released all the imprisoned Social-Democrats," said Ochab.

"You should have kept some of them," said Saburov ironically. "To whom are we going to drink the toast today, to the Social-Democratics?"

Khrushchev provided the answer:

"Let us drink to collaboration."

It was quite obvious that things in the camp were taking the wrong road. The "demons" which Khrushchev released from the bottle were stirring and poking out their tongues even at their liberator. He tried to manoeuvre, to get them on side, to set the others on to one (this time Ochab was in the dock), and then, when he saw that the quarrel was not dying down, he poured out threats and warnings to all.

And as the inveterate trickster he was, he knew how to find the best means of pressure. This time he used the weapon of bread. One of the Soviet Chinovniki (bureaucratic functionaries of Czarist Russia, Russian in the original), of COMECON reported briefly on the state of agriculture in the camp and sounded the alarm about the deficits in bread grain.

Khrushchev got up at once and exploited the opportunity:

"Bread is a vital problem," he said in a grave tone, in which both the pressure and the threat were clear. "We have given you what we had to give. Now we have no more to give you. Therefore, think well about bread, there is no other way..."

After continuing for several minutes to wave the whip of bread, suddenly his face brightened and he hopped with great pleasure to his favourite theme--maize. I cannot remember any of the meetings I have had with him, even those purely for political and ideological problems, in which Khrushchev did not eulogize the plant so dear to his heart.

"In recent years," he said, "we have given importance to maize and have achieved marvellous results. With maize," he continued, "we solved the problem of meat, milk and butter."

"Without meat, milk and butter there is no socialism," put in Mikoyan to sweeten up his "chief."

"No, there is not" replied Khrushchev and continued, "every leader must give importance to maize. Look, I took my native village under my patronage, and allow me to report to you the results: I found 60 pigs in the first year, increased them to 250 2 years ago, and now there are 600 of them."

And after this "colossal" report, imagine how befitting this was in the mouth of the number one leader of the Soviet Union, he hurled criticism at all of them--Ulbricht, Hegedus, Cyrankiewicz in turn.

"As to Albania," he added, "I have nothing to say because I do not know it."

I seized the opportunity and interjected:

"Come for a visit and get to know it."

"I can't give you an answer now, we shall meet separately," he said, and pressed on with his lecture, afraid that the inspiration might escape him.

He spun out the problem at great length, brought up examples, made criticism, and finally added:

"In regard to Bulgaria and Albania, which are countries with a large peasantry, but especially about Albania, we must think somewhat more deeply and help them."

As usual, the council decided that we should solve the problems we raised there with the Soviets.

Khrushchev's "gems" about "the construction of socialism" in Albania.

A few days later we met Khrushchev and talked for about an hour.

"First of all," I said, "we would like you to visit Albania. Your visit will have great importance for enhancing the authority and prestige of our country."

"I, too, would like to come," he told me, "but there are certain difficulties. How far is Albania from Moscow?"

He deserved to be told, "Just another 20 minutes beyond Belgrade," since he had become accustomed to that line long ago, but I bit my tongue. I told him that on a TU-104 the flight from Moscow to Tirana would take about 3 hours, and added:

"Let us establish this line."

"But the TU-104 has many seats. Would there be enough passengers to fill it?" he asked me, quick to catch at the "profitability."

"Our comrades and yours are always travelling from Moscow to Tirana and back and there is no reason for the aircraft to travel empty," I said.

"I would like to come," he repeated to excuse himself. "Indeed I told Tito that I wanted to visit Albania, but first I must take a holiday."

"You can have your holiday in our country," I said. "We have very fine beaches, as well as mountains."

"Oh, if I come I won't be able to rest," he said to close this question.

There was no reason for me to persist any further.

"As you wish," I said, and went on into economic matters. I gave him a brief outline of the situation and presented some of the problems, which were causing us most concern.

"The problem is," said Khrushchev, "that from now on we must think how to find sources of income so that Albania can advance. This is how the friends, also, should look at this problem. The question of Albania has great importance," he continued, "because by means of your country, we want to attract the attention of Turkey, Greece and Italy, that is, to have them take you as an example. Now this matter must be well thought out and we must find the proper ways."

He was silent for a moment, apparently in order to find one of these roads, and I thought that he would come up with Maize. But I was wrong.

"Do you grow cotton?" he asked me, "what area do you employ for this crop? What yield do you get?"

I replied to his questions.

"That is nothing," he said to me, and went on: "We think that you should develop the cotton crop, and in such a way that it will become a great asset, because it brings in a handsome income for you and our friends, for the countries of people's democracy which do not have cotton. Hence, you have great possibilities to profit from cotton. This is the first thing," he said, and raised one finger.

"Secondly," he continued, "the question of sheep raising is a problem for you," and he asked me about the number of sheep, the yield of wool, milk, meat, etc. After my replies he continued:

"Sheep must become another great asset for you. You must breed fine-wooled sheep. You have pastures and the sheep can be developed. Therefore you must find the most suitable breed, commence artificial insemination on a broad scale, and increase them."

After giving us his "second road" of development, Khrushchev began on the "third road" that would lead us to salvation. This had to do with fish.

"Fish," he said, "is another great asset for you. In the Scandinavian countries, in Norway, for example, they have created such a great wealth with fish, that not only do the people eat plenty of it, but they also export large quantities. They catch fish not only in their territorial waters, but also in the open seas. This is what you must do, too," instructed Khrushchev, "so that fish becomes a great asset for Albania. You must do these things without fail, and we shall help you, and send you specialists, a fishing fleet, etc."

Since the first three "roads" were leaving my mind boggling, all curiosity, I awaited a "fourth road" and he did not fail to make this clear to me also.

"The question of citrus fruit is important for you," he said. "They, too, should become a great asset for you, became lemons, grape fruit, oranges, etc, are in great demand."

These were his instructions for the "construction of socialism" in Albania. Finally he added:

"Thought must be given to other assets, too, for instance to minerals, but the main ones are those I mentioned.

"We will assist you to develop cotton, fishing, citrus fruit and sheep. Both you and we must study these things" he concluded, "and we are convinced that in this way Albania will quickly become an example for Greece, Turkey and Italy."

It was useless to enter into discussion about the "gems" of wisdom he presented to us. I thanked him for his "advice" and we parted.

Now everything was becoming more clear. The Council of Mutual Economic Aid recommends that we solve the economic problems with Khrushchev, Khrushchev recommends that we solve them with cotton, sheep and with...the miracle of fish."

All these stands and actions, seen in the complexity of political, ideological, military and other problems, were making us more than ever convinced that in our

camp, first of all in the Soviet Union, things were on the decline. Other events were to follow and we, living through them intensively, would learn and would prepare ourselves more for the coming battles.

[15 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 15 Oct (ATA)--In continuation of his book "The Khrushchevites (Memoirs)," Comrade Enver Hoxha exposes Khrushchev's attempts to rehabilitate the Yugoslav revisionists. At the same time he reflects the determined stand of the PLA in regard to this question.

The Touch-Stone

Khrushchev has his eyes on Yugoslavia. The first sign of the flirtation: The Soviet letter of June 1954, Khrushchev blames the information bureau for the Yugoslav leadership's betrayal. Intense exchange of cordial correspondence between Khrushchev and Tito. Khrushchev decides to rehabilitate the renegades. Our clear-cut opposition: The letters of May and June 1955. Talk with Ambassador Levichkin: "How can such decisions be taken so lightly and in a unilateral way?" Insistent invitation to go to the Soviet Union "on holiday." Meeting with Suslov. Mikoyan telephones at midnight: "Meet Tempo, iron out your disagreements." The meeting with S.V. Tempo.

All these things which occurred in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin worried our party and its leadership, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha. Of course at that period, especially before the 20th Congress, our suspicions were based on isolated facts, which the Soviet leaders covered up with torrents of demagoguery. Nevertheless, the stands they maintained in their meetings with us, their actions at home and abroad made us wary. Khrushchev's flirtations with Tito were particularly unpleasant for us. We, for our part, continued to fight Titoite Yugoslav revisionism with the greatest severity and defended the correct Marxist-Leninist stands of Stalin and the information bureau towards the Yugoslav revisionist leaders. We did this not only while Stalin was alive, but also in the transitional period that the Soviet Union went through after Stalin's death, when Khrushchev triumphed with his putsch and made the law there, as well as after Khrushchev fell. And this is the stand we shall always maintain towards Yugoslav revisionism until it is completely destroyed ideologically and politically.

We watched every action of Khrushchev's with great vigilance and attention. On the one hand, we saw that in general nothing was being said against Stalin, that there was talk of the unity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, that Khrushchev spoke against American imperialism in "strong" terms and made some superficial criticism of Titoism, while on the other hand, he waved the white flag of reconciliation and submission to them. In this situation we followed the course of friendship with the Soviet Union, struggled to safeguard and strengthen this friendship and this was not a tactic, but a matter of principle for us. Nevertheless, we did not allow wrong actions and deviations in line to go uncriticized when they appeared.

Khrushchev wanted at all cost, if not to subjugate the Yugoslav leadership, to line it up on his side.

For us, stresses Comrade Enver Hoxha the struggle against American imperialism and Yugoslav Titoism was a touch-stone to assess the stands of Khrushchev and the

Khrushchevites with the Marxist eye. In fact Khrushchev prattled against capitalism and American imperialism, but we did not like those half dozen daily meetings and priyoms, (receptions (Russian in the original)) with all kinds of American senators, multi-millionaires and businessmen. Khrushchev became a clown who performed all day and every day, lowering the dignity of the Soviet Union.

On the Yugoslav question, which was clear to us, and that is why we did not shift from our stand, the Khrushchevites chopped and changed, and ebbed and flowed like the tide. The Khrushchevites sometimes abused and sometimes kissed the Yugoslav leaders. When they were abusing the Titoites, the Soviet revisionists said we were right, when they were kissing them, they tried to make us soften our stand towards the Titoite revisionists.

Comrade Enver Hoxha underlines that Khrushchev had his eyes fixed on the leadership of Yugoslavia and wanted at all costs, if not to subjugate it, to line it up on his side. Of course, in Tito he was seeking both an ideological ally and a leader whom he could take under his wings as the "big brother" he was. In other words, Tito was very dear to Khrushchev, because he was the first to attack Stalin and reject Marxism-Leninism. In this direction they were in complete accord, but while the Belgrade chief operated openly, Khrushchev wanted to retain his disguise. In the international arena, Tito had become the "communist" dear to American imperialism and world capitalism, which lavished credits and aid on him, so that he would howl against the Soviet regime and the Soviet state and at the same time sell Yugoslavia to foreign capital.

After pointing out that Khrushchev wanted to manoeuvre Tito in his favour, Comrade Enver Hoxha writes that, Tito, for his part, had long dreamed of shifting the epicentre of the leadership of this alleged communism from Moscow to Belgrade, and that Belgrade should replace Moscow in eastern and south-eastern Europe. Tito's scheme had made no progress from the time he fell out with Stalin, who detected and sternly attacked the diabolical work of this renegade. Having the assistance of the Americans, Tito brought out this plan again when he saw that Nikita Khrushchev and his group were smashing the work of Lenin and Stalin.

Khrushchev distorts the historical truth.

During the days of our stay in Moscow, the Soviet leadership handed us a long letter, signed by Khrushchev, addressed to the central committees of the sister parties, in which they informed us about the conclusions which the Soviet leadership had reached on the Yugoslav question.

Distorting the historical truth, Khrushchev and company had reached the conclusion that Yugoslavia's breaking away from the socialist camp and the "isolation of the Yugoslav working class from the ranks of the international workers' movement" were entirely due to the "breaking off of relations between the CPY and the international communist movement" in 1948. According to them, the stand that was taken in 1948 and 1949 towards the Yugoslav party was wrong. Exposing Khrushchev's reasoning according to which this stand allegedly "forced the leading circles of Yugoslavia to make approaches to the USA and etc, Comrade Enver Hoxha writes:

According to this logic of Khrushchev's when our Party of Labour came into open confrontation and broke off contact with Khrushchevite revisionism, it would have

to sell itself and the country to imperialism, because otherwise it could not exist. And we heard this later from Khrushchev's own mouth when he accused us of selling ourselves "to imperialism for 30 pieces of silver."

This was nothing but an anti-Marxist, capitalist logic. Our party opposed Khrushchevite revisionism heroically, just as it had opposed Yugoslav revisionism earlier, and just as it fought resolutely against any other variant of revisionism, but it did not sell out and never will sell out to imperialism or anyone else, because as long as a party considers itself and respects itself as a genuine Marxist-Leninist party, whatever the conditions and situations it is in, it never allows itself to be bought or sold, but resolutely pursues its course, the course of uncompromising struggle against imperialism, revisionism and reaction.

In the letter which he handed us, Nikita Khrushchev went so far as to say openly that "many of the problems which served to cause differences between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not constitute serious reasons for dispute and even the misunderstandings that had arisen could have been settled." Nothing could have pleased Tito and the Yugoslav leadership more. With one stroke of his pencil, Khrushchev cancelled out major problems of principle which had been the basis of the struggle against Yugoslav revisionism, described them as "not serious reasons" and "misunderstandings," and hence, begged the traitors' pardon because they had allegedly been attacked over trifles.

But who were to blame for these "misunderstandings?" In his letter Khrushchev did not attack the information bureau, Stalin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or the other parties which supported the information bureau decisions of 1949 by name. Apparently, he considered it still too early to make these attacks. And those who were to blame were found to be Beria among the Soviets, who with his actions had caused "justifiable dissatisfaction among the Yugoslav leadership," and Djilas among the Yugoslavs (who had been condemned by Tito in the meantime), who "openly propagated liquidationist views," was "an active partisan for the orientation of Yugoslavia towards the Western countries," etc.

Thus, according to Khrushchev, the problem turned out to be very simple. The breach with Yugoslavia was based not on real reasons but on fabricated pretexts, so "we wronged you for nothing and the culprits have been found: Beria on our side, and Djilas on yours. Now we both have condemned these enemies, therefore, all we have to do is to kiss and make up and forget the past. What is more, in this letter, which disturbed us profoundly, Khrushchev vowed that everything he did was "in favour of Marxism-Leninism and socialism."

Unchangeable stand of the PLA towards the Yugoslav leadership.

Speaking about the reply in writing the PLA sent to the Soviet leadership, Comrade Enver Hoxha writes:

In this reply, without openly opposing Khrushchev, we stressed our permanent stand towards the revisionist leadership in Belgrade, emphasized the importance of the information bureau decisions of 1948 and 1949 and did not permit any allusion to the re-examination of the stand adopted previously towards the deviations in line of the Yugoslav leadership.

In our written reply we countered Khrushchev's idea that the "breaking off of relations drove the Yugoslav leaders into the lap of imperialism," with the thesis that it was the Yugoslav leaders themselves who betrayed Marxism-Leninism and set their people and their homeland on the course of enslavement and under the dictate of Anglo-American imperialists, that it was their anti-Marxist line which was the factor that gravely damaged the vital interests of the peoples of Yugoslavia, that it was they who took Yugoslavia out of the socialist camp, who changed the Yugoslav party into a bourgeois party and isolated it from the world movement of the proletariat.

While clearly pointing out these truths, we went on to stress that we agreed that efforts should be made by the communist parties to help rescue the peoples of Yugoslavia from enslavement and poverty, but we stressed once again that in our opinion the Yugoslav leaders had gone a long way down their anti-Marxist road, the road of submission to American and British imperialists.

With this we told Khrushchev indirectly that we did not agree with the hopes and illusions which he nurtured towards the Yugoslav leaders and especially towards "Comrade Tito," as he began to call him. I expressed these opinions to Khrushchev, also, in the next talk I had with him on 23 June 1954. However, he pretended not to notice the different stands each of us adopted over the Yugoslav problem. Perhaps he did not want to create conflicts with us in the first official meetings we had with him. Perhaps he underrated us and did not bother his head about our opposition. I remember that he was all euphoria and spoke with the assurance of some one who has everything running smoothly. He had just returned from a lightning visit to Czechoslovakia (he was a master of every kind of visit: lightning, incognito, official, friendly, much publicized, secret, day, night, announced and unannounced, short, long, with his suite or quite alone, etc.).

"In Prague," he told me, "I took up the Yugoslav problem again with representatives of several sister parties who were there. They were all fully in agreement with me and considered the efforts of our party very important."

Then looking me right in the eye, he added:

"Recently we, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians, Romanians, and others have taken good steps towards the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia..."

I sensed why he stressed this. He wanted to say to me: "See, we are all agreed. Hence you Albanians should join us, too."

I told him briefly that there is a very long history of our relations with the Yugoslav party and state, that the Yugoslav leadership itself was to blame for ruining our relations, and that if the Albanian-Yugoslav state relations were at a very low ebb, this was no fault of ours but a consequence of the unceasing and anti-Albanian stands and actions of the leaders in Belgrade.

"Konechno, konechno." (of course, of course (Russian in the original)), said Khrushchev jumping up and I understood that he did not want me to go any further with the discussion of this problem.

"We have taken all measures," he said. "Tomorrow our ambassador in Yugoslavia goes to meet Tito in Brioni. We think that there are great possibilities of achieving our objective. If nothing is achieved," he said in conclusion, "then we still have other methods."

This is how the romance of the Khrushchev-Tito love affair began. A few days later Khrushchev handed his opinions or "conclusions" about the "new analysis" of the Yugoslav problem in writing to Tito.

Tito's conditions for the relations with Khrushchev.

After leaving Khrushchev on tenterhooks for some time, in order to play on the strings which were out of tune, Tito finally replied to him by the middle of August 1954, also in writing.

The essence of the letter from the revisionist in Belgrade was more or less this: I am pleased that you, Nikita Sergeyevich, are proving to be a reasonable and broad-minded man, but go a bit further, come out more clearly for the new course of reconciliation and embraces. We Yugoslavs agree that we should be reconciled, Tito told Khrushchev, but as you know, we have taken up with new friends with whom we have strong and deep links. Therefore reconciliation with you "must develop in the direction which responds to our policy of international cooperation," that is to say, the Yugoslav's links with imperialism must not be damaged but must be further strengthened.

Likewise, in dictatorial tones, Tito did not fail to set Khrushchev a series of other conditions for their future relations:

First, Tito demanded that the Soviet side should work harder to eliminate the "negative elements" and remove the obstacles which had exerted an influence on the break in 1948 and obviously, with this the "master" in Belgrade was openly demanding that the whole correct and principled line followed by the information bureau, Stalin and the other communist parties in 1948, should be revised.

Second, the coming reconciliation, dictated Tito, must not imply "complete unanimity in our assessment of and stand towards events." Hence, let us be reconciled, but let each of us act on his own account, according to his own ideas.

Third, the road I follow and the road you follow for the construction of "socialism" is a matter for each of us to decide and must not influence the normalization of relations. Hence, I shall build "specific socialism" and you must accept this without any quibble.

Fourth, the causes of the conflict, said Tito, are neither Beria nor Djilas. The causes go deeper, therefore you, the Soviets, and the others united with you, must completely abandon the line of the time of Stalin, abandon your former principles, because in this way the true causes of the conflict are automatically overcome.

Finally, Tito rejected Khrushchev's proposal on a bilateral top-level meeting, making this conditional "on the achievement of preliminary successes in the direction of normalization." The implication was quite plain: If you want to meet me

and come to terms with me, you must take further steps on the course on which you have set out, must act more quickly and boldly within the Soviet Union and other countries and parties to spread and extend this "new" course, which had been and was his old course.

And Khrushchev, sometimes apparently resentful and sometimes enthusiastic in his actions, began to submit to and zealously apply Tito's conditions and orders.

Khrushchev's stands were leading the Soviet Union on an anti-Marxist course the PLA condemned Khrushchev's going to Belgrade.

Amongst us who followed this process with attention and concern, underlines Comrade Enver Hoxha, suspicions increased that these stands were leading the Soviet Union on an anti-Marxist course. Day by day we were becoming more convinced that Khrushchev was covering up a diabolical game with his clowning. We saw that he was lowering the prestige of the Soviet Communist Party and state by bending the knee to Tito. We watched this with regret, but, after all, the improvement of the relations between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs was their internal problem and we had no reason to oppose it. However, we were not and could never be in agreement with his efforts to wipe out the past and to treat the causes and reasons for the condemnation of the Yugoslav revisionists as something quite different from what they were in fact. Likewise, we could not agree to become Khrushchev's partners in this dubious and dangerous ideological and political gamble. What the Romanians, the Hungarians and the Bulgarians did was their affair. For our part, we were not going to kiss and make up with the Titoites.

Apart from his own revisionist convictions, Khrushchev was undoubtedly urged by Tito to take this anti-Marxist step. He did not want to bend the knee to Khrushchev, therefore he persisted in his demand that Khrushchev should come and bend the knee to him in Belgrade, should go to make a self-criticism in Canossa (Belgrade). And this is what was done. Khrushchev could hardly wait to rush off to Belgrade, where he kissed and embraced Tito, made a self-criticism and "resolutely wiped off the accumulations of the past," and opened the "epoch of friendship between the two peoples and the two parties."

Our party condemned Khrushchev's going to Belgrade and especially his decision to cleanse the uncleansable Tito. Just 2 or 3 days before he set out for "Canossa," Khrushchev informed us of the step he was about to take, but we had expected this, because the waters into which Khrushchev had plunged were bound to carry him to that mill. To go or not to go to Belgrade, that was his affair, let him do as he wished, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha. What revolted and profoundly disturbed us was the announcement he made in the same letter that he had decided to annul as unjust the decision of the information bureau of November 1949, in connection with the condemnation of the Yugoslav leadership, to communicate this new decision of his to Tito and to publish a communique about it in the organ "For Lasting Peace, for People's Democracy." In this communique, Khrushchev said that the communist and workers' parties, that were members of the information bureau, had allegedly reexamined the question of the third resolution of the meeting of the information bureau on the Yugoslav problem adopted in November 1949 and had decided that the accusations contained in that resolution against the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party should be considered as without foundation and the resolution of the information bureau on the Yugoslav question should be annulled.

We wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on this and protested sternly. Such a decision about an enemy of international communism, that had been condemned jointly by all the parties, could not be taken unilaterally by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union without consulting the other parties, including ours. The other parties submitted to the decision of Khrushchev and the desire of Tito that, after Khrushchev, the leaders of the parties of the socialist camp should go to Belgrade, kiss Tito's hand and beg his forgiveness. Dej and company went there, but we did not. We continued the struggle against the revisionists. It was in vain for Levichkin, the Soviet ambassador in Tirana, to come and try to convince us to withdraw our opposition.

[16 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 16 Oct (ATA)--We continue to transmit extracts from the book by Comrade Enver Hoxha "The Khrushchevites (Memoirs)."

We continue to transmit extracts from the book by Comrade Enver Hoxha "The Khrushchevites (Memoirs)."

Sudden changes in the stand of the Soviet leadership towards the Yugoslav question.

I received Levichkin--writes Comrade Enver Hoxha--and once again put forward in principle to him what we had written in the letter to the Soviet leadership.

Comrade Enver Hoxha writes that he told Levichkin that in connection with the Yugoslav question there are many differences between the content of earlier letters of the Soviet leadership and that of the last letter, confirming this with the content of letters.

In connection with this Comrade Enver Hoxha writes:

"Let us see," I said, and took the letters of the Soviet leadership. "Here for example, in the letter of 4 June 1954, your leadership writes: 'Reexamining the materials which have to do with the history of the breaking-off of relations between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the communist and workers' parties, as well as Yugoslavia's subsequent leaving the democratic camp, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union holds that the leading nucleus of the Yugoslav Communist Party has undoubtedly made serious departures from Marxism-Leninism, has slipped into the positions of bourgeois nationalism and launched attacks against the Soviet state. The leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party also extend their hostile policy, in regard to the Soviet Union, to the countries of people's democracy, towards which, up till before the break of relations, they maintained a boastful and disdainful stand, while seeking for themselves recognition of priorities and special merits which they did not have.'

"That letter also stresses," I told Levichkin, "that 'the criticism which the communist and workers' parties made of the nationalist deviations and other deviations from Marxism-Leninism of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party was necessary and completely correct. It contributed to tempering the communist and workers' parties from the Marxist aspect, to sharpening the vigilance of communists and to their education in the spirit of proletarian internationalism'."

"That is true," murmured Levichkin.

"Even after the initial efforts of the Soviet leadership to improve relations with Yugoslavia," I continued, "the Yugoslav leadership persisted in its former course and stands and, only 2 or 3 months ago, in February this year, the Soviet comrades wrote to us that 'the leadership of the Yugoslav party is seriously entangled with the capitalist world in its political and economic relations'."

"That is true, that is true," repeated Levichkin in a low voice.

"Then how did the opinion and stand of the Soviet leadership towards these very important problems change so surprisingly and suddenly?" I asked. "And how can they so readily take a unilateral decision such as that to throw out the 1949 decision of the information bureau?"

"Our political bureau discussed the problems which are raised in your letter of 23 May with great attention and concern and in our reply we openly and sincerely expressed a series of opinions to Comrade Khrushchev.

"First, we think that the general line, the main content and principle of the November 1949 resolution of the meeting of the information bureau is correct and the content of this resolution should not be taken separately from the resolution of July 1948. The daily experience of our party in our relations with the Yugoslavs, but before the break with them in 1948 and to this very day, confirms this correctness.

"Second, the procedure, which is proposed to follow for the cancellation of the November 1949 resolution of the meeting of the information bureau, does not seem to us correct. It seems to us that the very short time allowed the communist and workers' parties, members of the information bureau, to express their views in connection with the content of your letter is inadequate to decide such an important matter as that which is raised in the letter. In our opinion, such a hasty decision on a matter of major importance of principle, without first making a thorough analysis, together with all the parties interested in this question, and moreover, the publication of this decision in the press and its announcement in the Belgrade talks, would not only be premature, but would cause serious harm in the general orientation in connection with Yugoslavia.

"In regard to our Party of Labour, for 7 years it has been fighting to implement its general line in regard to Yugoslavia, which is founded on the resolutions of the information bureau and endorsed by the 1st Congress of our party. We are convinced that the general line of our party in connection with relations with Yugoslavia is correct, but even if we thought for one moment that there is something to be changed in this line, for this the congress of the party would have to be called together, or at least a conference of the party, and the change could be made only after first thoroughly analysing the general line of all the communist and workers' parties in regard to Yugoslavia as well as the decisions and conclusions of the information bureau.

"Therefore," I said to Levichkin in conclusion, "we propose that the matters which are raised in the recent letter of the Soviet leadership should be analysed at a meeting of the parties which participate in the information bureau, in which our party, too, could possibly take part and have its say. Only there can a joint decision on this question be taken."

Levichkin, who had gone pale as he listened to me, tried to convince me to change my opinion, but when he saw my insistence he retreated:

"I shall report what you have said to me to the leadership of the party."

"We have written everything I told you in our letter to Comrade Khrushchev," I concluded, "but I repeated it to you, too, to make clear to you what impelled us to adopt this stand."

Stalin and information bureau acted with great care and wisdom.
Khrushchev and company trampled with both feet over the most elementary rules of relations between parties.

Our opposition, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha further on, was completely correct and within the Marxist-Leninist norms of relations between parties. We were well aware how correct, substantiated and well based were the analyses and decisions of the information bureau and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in connection with the Yugoslav problem during the years 1948 and 1949. When the decision was taken to condemn the anti-Marxist activity of the Yugoslav leadership, we were not members of the information bureau. However, during that period, Stalin, the CPSU and the other parties that were members of the information bureau frequently consulted us and listened carefully to what we had to say in connection with our relations with the Yugoslav leadership. Stalin and his comrades did this, not only because ours were sister parties and, according to the Leninist norms, there should be wide-ranging and exhaustive exchanges of opinions, but also due to the important fact that, because of the special links we had had since the wartime years with the Yugoslav leadership, we had a lot to say about it.

Among the many meetings and consultations on this problem was my incognito meeting with Vyshinsky in Bucharest, at which Dej was also present. There we exchanged opinions about the common stand we should adopt towards the treacherous activity of the Yugoslav leadership. The many incontestable arguments and facts which I brought to that meeting were valued very highly by Vyshinsky and Dej, who described them as a valuable contribution which our party made to better knowledge of the hostile and anti-Marxist activity of the Belgrade leaders. This is not the place to speak at length about that meeting, from which I have many memories. I mention it only to show with what great care and wisdom Stalin and the information bureau acted at that time in the analyses they made and the decisions they took.

Now quite the opposite was occurring with Khrushchev and the other Soviet leaders. Precisely those who were now condemning the information bureau and Stalin for allegedly having acted and judged matters in an incorrect way, were trampling with both feet over the most elementary rules of relations between parties, were posing as indisputable masters who did not deign to seek the opinion of others. This could not fail to dismay and worry us.

The PLA in open opposition to the Khrushchevites.

Levichkin came to see us several other times during those days. Apparently they were urgently demanding from the centre that he convinced us to give up our opinions and reconcile ourselves to Khrushchev's stands. Those were very difficult and grave moments. From what we could see, Khrushchev must have reached agreement in advance with the leaderships of other parties over what he was going to do in Belgrade. Thus our proposal that the information bureau should meet to examine

the problem in detail, would fall on deaf ears. After we discussed the matter at length in the political bureau, we decided that I should summon Levichkin once more to make our stand clear to him. I met him on 27 May, one of the days on which Khrushchev was in Belgrade, and the things which I told Levichkin were also written in a second letter to the Soviet leadership. Later, Khrushchev used this letter of ours as an "argument" allegedly to prove that we were wrong in our first letter of 25 May, and that 2 days later we allegedly made a "self-criticism" and "retreated" from our former opinion. But the essence of the truth is not as Khrushchev and company said.

Both in the meeting with Levichkin on 27 May, and in the second letter to the Soviet leadership, we explained once again why we were in open opposition to them on this occasion.

In this letter we again stressed to the Soviet leadership that although we had been and were agreed that every effort must be made to solve the disagreements over principles with Yugoslavia in a Marxist-Leninist way, we were still convinced that the Yugoslav leaders would neither recognize their grave mistakes, nor abandon their course.

We have been and continue to be particularly sensitive on the Yugoslav question and especially towards the anti-Marxist activity of the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, we said in the letter, because this hostile activity against the Soviet Union, the countries of people's democracy and the whole movement of the proletariat has been carried out in a specially ferocious way against our party and the sovereignty of our homeland.

Seeing the problem in this way, we continued, when we read that part of your letter which says that eventually it might be communicated to the Yugoslavs that the resolution of the information bureau of November 1949 should be revoked and that a communique about this would be published in the organ "For Lasting Peace, for People's Democracy," we were profoundly shocked and said that if this were done it would be a very grave mistake. We considered that resolution should not be revoked, because it reflects the logical development of the hostile and anti-Marxist activity of the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party in practice.

This is how we reason: If this resolution is annulled, all that has been written there is cancelled out, and the trials of Rajk in Hungary and Kostov in Bulgaria, for example, are also annulled. By analogy the trial of the traitor gang headed by Koci Xoxe and company ought to be annulled, too. The hostile activity of the traitor gang of Koci Xoxe had its source in and was linked with the anti-Marxist, liquidationist and bourgeois-nationalist work of the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party. The just and principled struggle against this hostile activity was one of the directions of the line of our party at its 1st Congress.

"We will never budge from this correct line," we stressed in the letter. Hence, we thought that if this resolution is annulled as wrong, not only will the truth be distorted but a grave situation will be created for our party, confusion will be created, anti-party and enemy elements will be encouraged to become active against our party and state, as well as against Soviet Union. We can never allow such a situation to be created.

We went on to say to the Soviet leadership: "We have been in a grave situation and we regret that, on this point, we cannot be of the same opinion as you."

That was the essence of the content of our second letter to the Soviet leadership.

If there is any room to use the word "retreat" in regard to this, the only such thing on our part was the non-repetition of the proposal that a meeting of the information bureau should be organized first. By this time this proposal would have been valueless, because Khrushchev had made the whole affair a fait accompli and had left for Belgrade. On the other hand, although we expressed our opinion in defence of principles, we could not come out openly against the Soviet leadership and the others at a time when the problem was still developing. However, we made our vigilance even sharper and kept our eyes even wider open. For us, both in the past and even after this, the stand towards the revisionists of Belgrade has been and still is the touch-stone to prove whether a party is following a sound Marxist line or a wrong anti-Marxist line. In the future, we were to put Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites to this test.

The most pressing invitation to go "for a holiday in the Soviet Union."

Not long after this event, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha in the summer of 1955, I received a most pressing invitation to go "for a holiday in the Soviet Union."

In Stalin's time I went there for work and very rarely for a holiday. In Khrushchev's time they began to put such pressure on us to go for holidays that it was difficult to refuse, because the Soviets, for their part, put the matter forward on the political plane. However, I did not like to go because, in fact, I could not rest there.

Once in Moscow the meetings with the Soviet leaders would begin, but these meetings were no longer pleasant like those with Stalin. Now they were held sometimes with smothered anger, sometimes with open flare-ups.

This is what occurred on this occasion. As soon as I arrived in Moscow I had two meetings with Suslov.

In his opening words he told me that we would talk about the Yugoslav problem and stressed in a dictatorial tone:

"The leadership of your party must take careful account of this question. It must not look at the Yugoslav problem in a rigid way."

I did not take my eyes off him as I listened. Sensing my displeasure, he back-pedalled a little.

"Their mistakes remain mistakes," he said, "but our objective is to become friends and to advance the friendship with Yugoslavia. At its last meeting, our Central Committee once again analysed our relations with Yugoslavia," he continued, "and we shall give the report delivered there to you personally, because it is top secret."

He was silent for a moment, trying to assess what impression his words were making on me, and then went on:

"The main problem is that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has examined the Yugoslav question in a realistic light, bearing in mind the traitorous work of Beria, and we made self-criticism about this. Our central committee came to the conclusion that the breaking off of relations with Yugoslavia was a mistake, that is, we were hasty."

"In what way, hasty?" I said. "At that time, thorough analyses were made, long and thorough discussions were held and the true ideological and political causes of the existing disagreements were uncovered."

"The main cause for this break," continued Suslov, "was not the ideological issues, although they were making mistakes, and they have been pointed out openly to the Yugoslavs. The main cause lies in the slanders that were made against the Yugoslav leaders and in our lack of patience. The Yugoslavs' mistakes of principle should have been discussed, backed up by facts, and ironed out. This was not done."

"From all the facts examined," he continued, "it turns out that there is no basis at all for saying that the Yugoslav comrades have deviated and have sold Yugoslavia, just as it does not turn out that the Yugoslav economy is dependent on foreigners."

"Pardon me," I said, "but let us not go back to those things we have analysed and decided in 1948 and 1949. Let us take only your correspondence with the Yugoslav leadership during the last 2 years. Not only in several of your letters, but the Yugoslavs themselves in their letters, admit that they have created strong links with the West. What are we to think now of your opposite assessment of these matters?"

"A number of mistakes have been made, but they must be examined carefully," said Suslov, and started to list a series of "arguments" to convince me that the Yugoslav leaders were allegedly not on a wrong road. Naturally he also tried to lay the blame on Beria and Djilas and the efforts of imperialism "to attach Yugoslavia to itself."

"Molotov, too, has maintained a very sectarian stand on this problem," continued Suslov. "He personally made mistakes in state relations with Yugoslavia while insisting that it was the Yugoslav comrades that made the mistakes. However, the Central Committee demanded that Molotov prove where the Yugoslavs had been wrong, and we criticized him severely for his stand. Finally he, too, expressed his solidarity with the Central Committee."

I began to speak and gave a detailed presentation of our relations with the Yugoslav leadership, beginning from the years of the national liberation war. I mentioned their main activities as an anti-Albanian agency, which they had undertaken and were undertaking against us continually, and I concluded by saying:

"It is these and many other facts, one more grave than the other, which convince us that the Yugoslav leadership has not been and is not on the right road. Nevertheless, we have always been and still are in favour of developing state relations with them normally."

"Agreed, agreed," said Suslov. "We must act with open hearts. This is in the interest of our camp, we must not allow the imperialists to take Yugoslavia from us."

At the end of this meeting, as though in passing, he said to me:

"During past years you have condemned many enemies, accused of links with the Yugoslavs. Have a look at their cases and rehabilitate those that ought to be rehabilitated."

"We have never accused and condemned anyone for nothing," I said bluntly, and as we parted, he instructed me to be "more broadminded."

Manoeuvres of the Khrushchevites in their course of betrayal.

It was clear, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha, why they had invited me to come for a holiday. However, the Khrushchevites did not content themselves just with this. They had hatched up diabolical plans to compel our party, too, to follow their course of conciliation with the revisionists of Belgrade.

Comrade Enver Hoxha writes how Mikoyan had phoned him after midnight, saying:

"Comrade Enver, Comrade Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo is here in Moscow and I was with him till now. You know him and it would be good if you were to meet, he is ready to meet you tomorrow."

For a time I remained silent on the telephone, while Mikoyan, who had no intention of asking, said: "Tomorrow then, you agree," in a tone as if he were giving an order to the party secretary of an oblast (region--Russian in the original).

"How could I agree to this, Comrade Mikoyan," I said. "I talked with Comrade Suslov, and expressed the view of our party about the position of Yugoslavia and Tito."

Mikoyan began to deliver a standard monologue about "socialist Yugoslavia," about Tito who was "a fine chap," about Beria's mistakes and the sins they had allegedly committed (the Soviet Union and the information bureau), and then he concluded:

"You ought to take this step, Comrade Enver. You know Tempo, talk with him and try to iron out your differences, because this is in your interest and in the interest of the camp. You, too, must help ensure that Yugoslavia does not go over to the imperialist camp...So, you agree, tomorrow."

"All right, I agree, tomorrow," I replied, clenching my teeth in rage. I went back to bed but I was so disgusted over these backstage manoeuvres and faits accomplis which the Khrushchevites were hatching up in the course of their betrayal that I could not sleep. I had met Tempo twice in Albania during the time of the war and both times we had quarrelled, because he was arrogant and a real megalomaniac. He made unfounded accusations against our war and the people who led it, or made absurd proposals about the "Balkan staff," without mentioning how this staff was to function in those conditions, when we could communicate from one zone to the other within the country only with difficulty, let alone mentioning the ulterior

motives hidden behind the organization of this "staff." [Sentence as received] What was I to say to Tempo now, after all those things which Tito, Rankovic, their envoys Velimir Stojnic, Nijaz Dizdarevic and their agents Koci Xoxe and Co., had done to us? Must we swallow this too? I tossed and turned sleepless all night thinking about what should be done. The time had not come yet to settle accounts with the Khrushchevite revisionists.

The next day we met Tempo. I began to speak about those things that had occurred.

"Let bygones be bygones," he said and began to speak about the situation in Yugoslavia. He told me that they had made progress in the sector of industry but were short of raw materials.

"Our agriculture is in a very bad state," he said, "we are very far behind, therefore, we think we should devote more forces to it. The mistakes we have made in agriculture have left us hard pressed."

He went on to tell me about the difficulties they had had and said that they had been obliged to accept aid at heavy interest rates from the Western countries.

"Now the Soviet Union is helping us and our agreement with the Soviets is going well," he concluded.

I, too, spoke about the progress which our country had made during this time and the difficulties which we had had and still had. I spoke about the commission on the Ohri Lake, in which the discussions were being dragged on by their side, but he told me he knew nothing about it because "these were the plans of the Macedonians."

"Nevertheless, we must look more carefully at the question of the Shkodra Lake where the benefits will be greater for both sides, especially for your side," he added.

And that is how the meeting which the Soviets had arranged between Tempo and me, passed. After this meeting, when I met Mikoyan and Suslov, they both said to me:

"You did well to meet Tempo because the ice has been broken."

According to them, the mountain of ice created between us and the Titoite revisionists could be broken with one chance meeting or another but this was not our opinion. There would be no "spring thaw" in the ideological field in our relations with Yugoslavia and we had no intention of plunging into the murky waters of the Khrushchevites and the Titoites.

[17 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 17 Oct (ATA)--In the pages of his book "The Khrushchevites (Memoirs)," Comrade Enver Hoxha exposes and condemns through numerous facts the attempts of Khrushchev for hegemony in the world communist movement, his attacks on the COMINTERN and the information bureau, his feverish activity to eliminate the revolutionary leaders and to bring anti-Marxist elements in the leadership of other parties.

The "Mother Party" Wants to Be the Conductor

Khrushchev seeks hegemony in the world communist movement. His attack on the COMINTERN and the information bureau. The Khrushchevites extend their tentacles to other parties. The sudden deaths of Gottwald and Bierut. Unforgettable memories from the meeting with Dimitrov and Kolarov. Correct but formal relations with Romania. The opportunist zig-zags of the Romanian leadership. Pleasant impressions from Czechoslovakia. Wandering at will and visits to historical sites. Suffocating atmosphere everywhere in the Soviet Union. The Chinovniki surround us everywhere. Our relations with the East Germans.

I spoke earlier about the "lecture" which Khrushchev gave me on the role of the first secretary of the party and the "opinion" which he had expressed to the Polish comrades about the replacement of Bierut by Ochab in this post. This fact, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha, not only astounded me but seemed to me completely unacceptable, as a tactless undertaking (to put it mildly) towards a sister party.

Further developments were to make clear to us and convince us that such "undertakings" were Khrushchev's normal forms of "work" to put the international communist movement under his personal domination.

The opinion of Khrushchev and other modern revisionists against the COMINTERN was in complete accord with the monstrous accusations of capitalism and the reactionary bourgeoisie throughout the world.

This activity did not lack its demagogic cloak. The essence of this demagogy was: "Stalin kept the communist and workers' parties in his grip through force, through terror, and dictated actions to them in the interests of the Soviet Union and to the detriment of the world revolution." Khrushchev was for struggle against the COMINTERN, except, allegedly, for the period when Lenin was alive. For Khrushchev and the other modern revisionists, the COMINTERN operated simply as a "Soviet agency in the capitalist countries." Their opinion, which was not expressed openly, but was implied, was in complete accord with the monstrous accusations of capitalism and the reactionary bourgeoisie throughout the world, that fought the betrayal by social-democracy and the second international.

By means of the COMINTERN, Lenin and later Stalin consolidated the communist and workers' parties and strengthened the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the rising fascist dictatorship. The activity of the COMINTERN was positive and revolutionary. The possibility that some mistakes may have been made is not ruled out, but it is necessary to bear in mind the difficult circumstances of illegality in which the parties and the leadership of the COMINTERN itself were obliged to work, as well as the fierce struggle waged against the communist parties by imperialism, the bourgeoisie and reaction. The true revolutionaries never forget that it was the COMINTERN which assisted to set up and strengthen the communist parties after the betrayal by the second international, just as they never forget that the Soviet Union of Lenin and Stalin was the country in which hundreds of revolutionaries found refuge to escape the reprisals of the bourgeoisie and fascism and carry on their activity.

In his incorrect assessment of the work of the COMINTERN and Stalin, Khrushchev also had the support of the Chinese.

In his assessment of the work of the COMINTERN and Stalin, Khrushchev also had the support of the Chinese, who continue to make criticism, although not publicly, in this direction. When we have had the opportunity, we have expressed our opinion about these incorrect assessments of the overall work of the COMINTERN and Stalin to the Chinese leaders. When I had the opportunity to talk with Mao Zedong during my only visit to China in 1956, or in the meetings with Zhou Enlai and others in Tirana, I have expressed the well-known viewpoint of our party about the figure of Stalin and the COMINTERN. I do not want to extend on these matters because I have written about them at length in my political diary and elsewhere.

The decisions of the COMINTERN and Dimitrov's direction-giving speech in July 1935 have gone down in the history of the international communist movement as major documents which mobilized the peoples, and first of all the communists, to create the anti-fascist front and to organize themselves for armed struggle against Italian fascism, German Nazism and Japanese militarism. In this struggle, the communists and their parties were in the forefront everywhere.

Therefore, it is a crime to attack the great work of the COMINTERN and the Marxist-Leninist authority of Stalin, which played a major role in the creation and the organizational, political and ideological consolidation of the communist and workers' parties of the world. For its part, the Bolshevik Party was a powerful aid for those parties, and the Soviet Union, with Stalin at the head was a great potential in support of the revolution in the international arena.

Imperialism, the capitalist bourgeoisie and its fascist dictatorship fought the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party and Stalin, with all their might, waged a stern struggle against the COMINTERN and the communist and workers parties of every country and ruled the working class with terror, bloodshed and demagogy.

When Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the communist and workers' parties of various countries took up arms, united with the other patriots and democrats in their own countries and fought the fascist invaders. Because of this natural struggle, the enemies of communism said: "The communist and workers' parties have put themselves in the service of Moscow." This was a slander. The communist and workers' parties fought for the liberation of their own peoples, fought for the working class and people to take power. In the great alliance of the anti-fascist war, the sympathies of these parties were with the Soviet Union because it was the most reliable guarantee for the victory.

It was Stalin himself, who, on behalf of the executive committee of the COMINTERN, announced the decision for the disbanding of the COMINTERN and the reason given was that no further need was felt for its existence. This stand was completely correct, because by that time the communist and workers' parties had become mature and militant, had been tempered in class battles and in the great war against fascism and had gained colossal experience. Now, each party could march on its own feet and had Marxism-Leninism as its unerring guide.

The information bureau of the communist and workers' parties was necessary. Khrushchev took his unilateral decision and liquidated the information bureau, without asking anyone about it. The big Indian reactionary, Nehru heard the news of the breakup of the information bureau before our communist parties.

After the second world war the information bureau of communist and workers' parties was formed. It was necessary to create this, because the parties of socialist countries and those of capitalist countries, especially of Europe, needed to exchange their very valuable experience. The exchange of experience between our parties was especially necessary in the unsettled period immediately after the war, when American and British imperialism wanted to interfere by any means in the internal affairs of the countries which had won their freedom.

The book reads further on: The "Marxist" Tito made a major issue of the Venezia Giulia Province, claiming that the Soviet Union was not assisting him to take this province, which he described as entirely Yugoslav, while this same "Marxist" not only did not raise the issue of Kosovo, which was truly Albanian, in order to give it to Albania to which it belonged, but did his utmost to prevent any talk about it. The Belgrade clique massacred people from Kosovo, alleging that they were Ballists, and later also attempted to gobble up the whole of Albania and turn it into the seventh republic of Yugoslavia.

The information bureau uncovered the treachery of the Yugoslav revisionists and this was one of its historic deeds and a tribute to the revolutionary vigilance of Stalin. Tito was exposed and condemned with ample, incontestable facts and subsequent events completely confirmed his betrayal. In this just action, which came after a patient stand, first with comradely explanation, then with rebuke and finally, with condemnation, all the communist and workers' parties took part, not because they "submitted to the arbitrary decision of Stalin" as has been slanderously alleged, but because they were convinced by the true facts which were brought out about the betrayal of the Yugoslav chiefs. Later, all these parties, apart from the Party of Labour of Albania, ate the very words which they themselves had said and endorsed against Tito and Titoism. One after another, the chiefs of these parties made self-criticism, went on pilgrimages to him, kissed his hand, begged his forgiveness and declared that he was a "genuine Marxist-Leninist," while according to them, Stalin was "an anti-Leninist, a criminal, an ignoramus and a dictator."

Khrushchev's plan, as all his work and his successive actions showed, was to rehabilitate Tito by going to Belgrade and denouncing Stalin for the "crime" and the [as received] which he had allegedly committed in this direction. In order to carry this problem through to the end Khrushchev took his unilateral decision and liquidated the information bureau, without asking anyone about it. He dropped this on us as a fait accompli (French in the original) at one of the meetings which was organized in the Kremlin over a problem which had nothing at all to do with the information bureau.

Khrushchev announced the decision, and while administering the last rites to the information bureau said: "When I informed Nehru of this, he was pleased and told me that it was a wise decision which everybody would approve." The big Indian reactionary heard the news of the breakup of the information bureau before our

communist party. This fact, too, apart from others, showed what this renegade, this revisionist-Trotskyite, who had come to the head of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was.

Khrushchev aimed to get control of the whole world communist movement. The sound leaders were eliminated through intrigues, putsches or even assassinations.

With cunning Trotskyite forms and methods, such as flattery, blackmail, criticism and threats, Khrushchev aimed to get control of the whole world communist movement, to have all the other parties under his "conductor's baton." And they, without his telling them openly, were to proclaim the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the "mother party," and moreover to think, as Liri Belishova, a secret agent of the Soviet revisionists whom we exposed later, put it, that "Khrushchev is our father." This is the direction in which Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites worked.

Of course, the Khrushchevites had begun this work when Stalin was still alive, behind his back. We base this conviction on the experience of our relations with the Soviet leaders, the arrogant, huckster's stand of Mikoyan and some others.

After Stalin's death, their attack to destroy socialism in the other countries mounted continuously. Both in the Soviet Union and in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary, as well as in Albania, Khrushchev began to incite the disguised and undisguised anti-Marxist elements. Wherever these elements were in the leadership, Khrushchev and company struggled to get these elements under his control, and where they were not in the leadership, to put them there by eliminating the sound leaders through intrigues, putsches or even assassinations, as they wanted to do with Stalin (and it is very likely they did this).

Immediately after the death of Stalin, Gottwald died. This was a sudden, surprising death. It had never crossed the minds of those who knew Gottwald that this strong, agile, healthy man would die...of a flu or a chill allegedly caught on the day of Stalin's funeral ceremony.

I knew Gottwald. When I went to Czechoslovakia and met him in Prague, we talked at length about our problems. He was a modest, sincere comrade, not a man of many words. I felt I could talk to him freely, he listened to me attentively, puffing away at his pipe and spoke with much sympathy about our people and our fight, and promised me that they would help us in the building of industry. He promised me neither mountains nor miracles, but a very modest credit which Czechoslovakia accorded us.

"This is all we can do," he said. "Later, when we have our economy going, we shall re-examine matters with you."

Gottwald, an old friend and comrade of Stalin and Dimitrov, died suddenly. This grieved us, but also surprised us.

Later came the equally unexpected death of Comrade Bierut, not to mention the earlier death of the great George Dimitrov. Dimitrov, Gottwald and Bierut, all died in Moscow. What a coincidence--the three of them were comrades of the great Stalin.

Edward Ochab replaced Bierut in the post of first secretary of the party. Thus Khrushchev's old desire was realized. Later, however, Khrushchev "fell out" with Ochab, apparently because he did not fulfill Khrushchev's demands and orders as he should have done. That is why Khrushchev later launched attacks on Ochab at those meetings at which we, too, were present.

Ochab came and went like a shadow, without being a year in that position.

It is clear that with the death of Bierut the road to the throne of Poland was opened to the reactionary Gomulka. This "communist," brought out of prison, after a number of ups and downs and writhings of a heterogeneous leadership, in which agents of Zionism and the capitalist powers were not lacking, was to be brought into the leadership by his friend Nikita Khrushchev.

Poland was the "big sister" of the Khrushchevite Soviet Union. Then came Bulgaria, with which the Khrushchevites played and are still playing their game shamelessly, to the point that they have turned it into their "obedient daughter."

Further on Comrade Enver Hoxha writes about his reminiscences from the meetings with Dimitrov and Kolarov.

I met Dimitrov and Kolarov, these outstanding Bulgarian communists only once in my life, but they left an indelible impression on my memory. After Dimitrov, Kolarov became prime minister and was one of the initiators of the condemnation of the Titoite agent, Kostov. But only a few months later Kolarov died. His death, too, grieved me greatly.

Comrade Enver Hoxha also writes about the changes which were made in the leaderships of the parties of other countries of people's democracy underlining also the relations of Albania with these countries.

In continuation of his book Comrade Enver Hoxha describes the heavy sense of isolation he felt in Moscow after Khrushchev took over the reins. As soon as we arrived in Moscow, he writes, they allocated us a dacha (country villa, Russian in the original) on the outskirts of the city, where we remained isolated for whole days. Officials such as Lesakov, Moshatov, Petrov and some other minor functionaries of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the party would be there or would come and go, usually to accompany us, but also to eat and drink. They were all peoples of the security service, dressed as functionaries of the Central Committee, i.e., people of the apparatus.

I was never free, I always had an escort. They were all Khrushchev's men, informers for the Central Committee and the Soviet security service, without taking account here of the official guards and the bugging devices with which they filled the various villas in which we stayed. But that is another story. Let us pass over the devices and concentrate on the people.

These Soviet employees tried to find out our *nastroyenie* (humor, Russian in the original), in order to learn what we were seeking, what we would raise, with whom we would raise it, what the situation was in our country, what we thought about the Yugoslavs, about the leaders of the Greek Communist Party, or any other matter. They knew why they came and we knew who sent them and why they were sent, therefore

both sides were friendly, we talked about what interested us and waited for news to come from the Central Committee about when we were to meet. The Chinovniki did not talk about politics, no doubt because they had orders about this, but even if they had wanted to open some conversation they did not dare, because they knew that every word would be recorded. We talked especially against the Titoite revisionists. You could not visit any collective farm or state farm, or make contact with the comrades or the people without giving 2 or 3 days notice. And if you did go on a visit, they would sit you down at a table laden with drinks and fruit and you would see nothing, no cattle stall or collective farmer's house.

Comrade Enver Hoxha stressed further on in his book that the Khrushchevites wanted to have not only the countries of people's democracy, but also the whole international communist movement, under their direction.

I shall speak elsewhere about the revisionist and opportunist views and stands of such leaders as Togliatti, Thorez, etc, but I want to stress here that, after the death of Stalin both Togliatti and the others began to express their revisionist views more openly, because they sensed that Khrushchev and his circle were their ideological and political allies, because they saw Khrushchev's opportunist line towards the Titoites, the Social-Democrats, the bourgeoisie, etc. This line which Khrushchev was building up suited Togliatti and Co, who, to one degree or another, had long been following the line of collaboration with the bourgeois parties and the bourgeois governments of their own countries and fighting and dreaming that they would become the sponsors of marriages of convenience and take seats in those governments. These tendencies were latent at first, were displayed hesitantly, but after the 20th Congress they bloomed into "theories," like Togliatti's famous "polycentrism," or his "Italian road to socialism."

Of course, within the world communist movement, the Khrushchevites did not come out with a completely open revisionist platform right from the start. Just as within the Soviet Union, they tried to adopt a flexible line, in order to avoid arousing an immediate reaction in either their own party or the others. The "Leninism" of which they spoke, the odd good word dropped here or there about Stalin, their noisy advertisement of "Leninist principles in the relations among the socialist countries," served to disguise the plots they were hatching up, and to gradually prepare the ground for their subsequent frontal attack. This they launched at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There they laid their cards on the table, because Khrushchev and Co. had worked for a long time to paralyze any possible reaction inside or outside the country.

[18 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 18 Oct (ATA)--Further on Comrade Enver Hoxha writes in his book about the preparations and the holding of the ill-famed 20th Congress of the CPSU which legalized the thoroughly anti-Marxist theses of Khrushchev, about the "secret" report of Khrushchev against Stalin, about the liquidation of the opponents of Khrushchev in the leadership of the CPSU and about the constant pressure on the PLA to divert it from its principled and correct stand.

The Official Proclamation of Revisionism

The 20th Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev's theses--the charter of modern revisionism. The "secret" report against Stalin. Togliatti demands recognition of his "merits." Tito in the Soviet Union.

Molotov is dismissed from the task of foreign minister. Abortive attempt of the "anti-party group." The end of the career of Marshal Zhukov. Another victim of the Khrushchevites' backstage manoeuvres: Kirichenko. May 1956: Suslov demands that we rehabilitate Kock Xoxe and company. June 1956: Tito and Khrushchev are displeased with us. July 1957: Khrushchev arranges a dinner in Moscow so that we meet Rankovic and Kardelj.

The betrayal at the top of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the country where the October socialist revolution was carried out, writes Comrade Enver Hoxha, was an all-round attack on the name and great teachings of Lenin, and especially on the name and work of Stalin.

The "striving" and the big expenditure of imperialism to force Khrushchev and company to go further and further down the road of capitulation and betrayal were not in vain.

In the framework of its post-Second World War strategy, imperialism headed by American imperialism, when it saw the first vacillations and retreats of the new Soviet leadership, further intensified its all-round attacks and pressure to force Khrushchev and company to go further and further down the road of capitulation and betrayal. The "striving" and big expenditure of imperialism in this counter-revolutionary direction were not in vain. Having set out on their course of concession and betrayal, Khrushchev and his henchmen were continually justifying the long-standing efforts and the old desires of imperialism.

The 20th Congress officially legalized the thoroughly anti-Marxist, anti-socialist theses of Khrushchev and his collaborators.

When they thought that they had strengthened their positions, had control of the army through the marshals, had turned the security force to their course, had won over the majority of the Central Committee, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and the other Khrushchevites prepared the notorious 20th Congress held in February 1956, at which they delivered the "secret" report against Stalin.

This congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has gone down in history as the congress which officially legalized the thoroughly anti-Marxist, anti-socialist theses of Nikita Khrushchev and his collaborators, as the congress which flung the doors open to the penetration of alien, bourgeois-revisionist ideology in a series of communist and workers' parties of the former socialist countries and the capitalist countries. All the distortions of the major issues of principle, such as those about the character of our epoch, the roads of transition to socialism, peaceful coexistence, war and peace, the stand towards modern revisionism and towards imperialism, etc, etc, which later became the basis of the great, open polemic with modern revisionism, have their official beginning in Khrushchev's report to the 20th Congress.

Many were misled by the demagogy of the Khrushchevite traitors. However, the Party of Labour of Albania was not misled.

From the time Stalin died to the 20th Congress, the Khrushchevite conspirators manoeuvred cunningly with "bureaucratic legality," "the rules of the party,"

"collective leadership" and "democratic centralism" shed crocodile tears over the loss of Stalin, thus step by step preparing to torpedo the work of Stalin, his personality and Marxism-Leninism. This is a period full of lessons for the Marxist-Leninists, because it brings out the bankruptcy of "bureaucratic legality," which represents a great danger to a Marxist-Leninist party, brings out the methods which the revisionists used to profit from this "bureaucratic legality," brings out how leaders, who are honest and experienced but who have lost the revolutionary class spirit fall into the traps of intriguers and give way, retreat before the blackmail and demagoguery of revisionist traitors disguised with revolutionary phraseology. In its transition period we saw how the Khrushchevites, in order to consolidate their power, operated allegedly with "a great party spirit," "free from the fear of Stalin" "with truly democratic and Leninist forms," about which they set up a great clamour, while they worked actively to organize the filthiest slanders which only the bourgeoisie has been able to concoct against the Soviet Union, Stalin and the entire socialist order. All these monstrous calumnies of the Khrushchevite revisionists, all their destructive activity, were intended to "prove," allegedly with legal documents, with "arguments" and "analyses in the new," the slanders which the reactionary bourgeoisie had been spreading for many years against Marxism-Leninism, the revolution and socialism.

Every good thing of the past was distorted, allegedly in the light of the "new situations," "new developments," "new roads and possibilities," in order to go ahead.

Many were misled by this demagoguery of traitors. However, the Party of Labour of Albania was not misled. It has made a detailed principled analysis of this question and has had its say in defence of the Marxist-Leninist truth long ago.

The liberal spirit pervaded the whole atmosphere, the Soviet press and propaganda like an ominous cloud during the days of the 20th Congress.

Together with Comrades Mehmet Shehu and Gogo Nushi, I was appointed by our party to take part in the proceedings of the 20th Congress. The opportunist "new spirit," which Khrushchev was arousing and activating, was apparent in the way in which the proceedings of this congress were organized and conducted. This liberal spirit pervaded the whole atmosphere, the Soviet press and propaganda of those days like an ominous cloud, it prevailed in the corridors and the congress halls, it was apparent in people's faces, gestures and words.

The former seriousness, characteristic of such extremely important events in the life of a party and a country, was missing. Even non-party people spoke during the proceedings of the congress. In the breaks between sessions, Khrushchev and company strolled through the halls and corridors, laughing and competing with one another as to who could tell the most anecdotes, make the most wisecracks and show himself the most popular, who could drink the most toasts at the heavily laden tables which were placed everywhere.

With all this, Khrushchev wanted to reinforce the idea that the "grave period," the "dictatorship" and "gloomy analysis" of things were over once and for all and the "new period" of "democracy," "freedom," the "creative examination" of events and phenomena, whether inside or outside the Soviet Union, was officially beginning.

The bourgeoisie and reaction gave exceptional publicity to Khrushchev's "new developments."

In fact, the first report delivered by Khrushchev at the congress, which was trumpeted loudly as a "colossal contribution" to the fund of Marxism-Leninism and a "creative development" of our science, constitutes the official charter of modern revisionism. From those days on, the bourgeoisie and reaction gave exceptional publicity to Khrushchev's "new development," spoke openly about the radical changes which were occurring in the Soviet Union and in the political and ideological line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

While they gleefully welcomed Khrushchev's great and radical about-turn, reaction and the bourgeoisie, at the same time did not fail to describe this turn on some occasions as "more dangerous" to their interests than the line of the time of Stalin. Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites used these "criticisms" by the bourgeoisie as arguments to convince the others that the "new line" was "correct" and "Marxist," but in fact, the fear of the international bourgeoisie had another source: in Khrushchev and his "new policy" it saw not only a new ally, but also a new and dangerous rival for spheres of influence, plunder, wars and invasions.

The report against Stalin was with catastrophic consequences for the Soviet Union and the communist and worker movement.

On the last day, the congress proceeded behind closed doors because the elections were to be held, and we were not present at the sessions. In fact that day, besides the elections, a second report by Khrushchev was read to the delegates. It was the notorious, so-called secret report against Stalin, but which had been sent in advance to the Yugoslav leaders, and a few days later it fell into the hands of the bourgeoisie and reaction as a new "gift" from Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites. After it was discussed by the delegates to the congress, this report was given to us and all the other foreign delegations to read.

Only the first secretaries of sister parties taking part in the congress read it. I spent all night reading it, and extremely shocked, gave it to Mehmet and Gogo to read. We had known in advance that Khrushchev and company had cancelled out the glorious work and figure of Stalin and we saw this during the proceedings of the congress in which his name was never mentioned in favourable terms. But we could never have imagined that all those monstrous accusations and calumnies against the great and unforgettable Stalin could have been put on paper by the Soviet leaders. Nevertheless, there it was in black and white. It had been read to the Soviet Communists, who were delegates to the congress, and had been given to the representatives of other parties taking part in the congress to read. Our hearts and minds were deeply and gravely shocked. Amongst ourselves we said that this was a villany which had gone beyond all bounds, with catastrophic consequences for the Soviet Union and the movement, and that in those tragic circumstances, the duty of our party was to stand firm on its own Marxist-Leninist positions.

After we had read it we immediately returned the terrible report to its owners. We had no need for that package of filthy accusations which Khrushchev had concocted. It was other "communists" who took it away to give to reaction and to sell by the ton in their book-stalls as a profitable business.

We returned to Albania heart-broken over what we had seen and heard in the homeland of Lenin and Stalin, but at the same time we returned with a great lesson that we must be more vigilant and more alert towards the activities and stands of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites.

The black smoke of the ideas of the 20th Congress began to spread very quickly: the revisionist elements, who up till yesterday had kept under cover, now came out openly.

Only a few days later the black smoke of the ideas of the 20th Congress began to spread everywhere.

Palmiro Togliatti, our near neighbour, who had shown himself to be the most remote and unapproachable towards us, was among the first to come out in his party beating his breast. Not only did he praise to the skies the new "prospects" which the congress of the Soviet revisionists opened, but he demanded that his merits should be recognized as the precursor of Khrushchev in regard to many of the new theses and as "an old fighter" for those ideas. "In regard to our party," declared Togliatti in March 1956, "it seems to me that we have acted courageously. We have always been interested in finding our own way, the Italian way, of development towards socialism."

The revisionists of Belgrade rejoiced and aroused themselves as never before, while the other parties of the countries of people's democracy began, not only to envisage the future, but also to re-examine the past, in the spirit of Khrushchev's theses. Revisionist elements, who up till yesterday had kept under cover while they poured out their poison, now came out openly to settle accounts with their opponents. The wave of rehabilitations of condemned traitors and enemies erupted, the doors of prisons were opened and many of those who had been condemned were placed directly in the leadership of the parties.

Khrushchev fulfilled the condition set by Belgrade: Molotov was removed from the post of the foreign minister of the Soviet Union.

The Khrushchev clique was the first to set the example. At the 20th Congress, Khrushchev boasted that more than 7,000 persons condemned in the time of Stalin had been liberated from the prisons of the Soviet Union and rehabilitated. This process was to continue and be deepened.

Khrushchev and Mikoyan began to liquidate, one by one, and finally all together, those members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party whom they were to describe as an "anti-party group." After they brought down Malenkov, replacing him temporarily with Bulganin, Molotov's turn came. This took place on 2 June 1956. That day the newspaper "PRAVDA" carried a huge photograph of Tito on the front page and the dobro pazhalovat (welcome, Russian in the original) to the head of the Belgrade clique arriving in Moscow, and page four ended a report of daily events with the "news" about the removal of Molotov from the post of foreign minister of the Soviet Union. The report said that Molotov had been released from this position "at his own request," but in fact he was released because this was a condition laid down by Tito for his coming to the Soviet Union for the first time since the breaking off of relations in 1948-1949. And Khrushchev and company immediately fulfilled the condition set by Belgrade for Tito's satisfaction, since

Molotov, together with Stalin, had signed the letters which the Soviet leadership had sent the Yugoslav leadership in 1948.

Polyansky's admissions on the dismissal of Khrushchev in the summer of 1957 and how Khrushchev was restored to power.

The positions of the revisionist reactionaries were becoming stronger and their opponents in the Presidium, Malenkov, Molotov, Kagenovich, Voroshilov and others, now began to see more clearly the revisionist intrigue and the diabolical plans which Khrushchev hatched up against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party in the Kremlin in the summer of 1957, after many criticisms Khrushchev was left in the minority, and, as Polyansky told us from his own mouth, Khrushchev was dismissed from the task of the first secretary and was appointed minister of agriculture, since he was an "expert on kukuruza" (maize, Russian in the original). However, this situation did not last more than a few hours. Khrushchev and his supporters secretly gave the alarm, the marshals surrounded the Kremlin with tanks and soldiers and gave orders that not even a fly was to leave the Kremlin. On the other hand, aircraft were sent to the four corners of the Soviet Union to gather up the members of the plenum of the CC of the CPSU. "Then," said Polyansky, this product of Khrushchev, "we entered the Kremlin and demanded admission to the meeting. Voroshilov came out and asked what we wanted. When we told him that we wanted to enter the meeting, he cut us short. When we threatened to use force he said: 'What does all this mean?' But we warned him: 'Mind your words, otherwise we shall arrest you.' We entered the meeting and changed the situation." Khrushchev was restored to power.

Thus, after this forlorn attempt, these former co-fighters of Stalin's, who had associated themselves with the slanders made against his glorious work, were described as an "anti-party group" and received the final blow from the Khrushchevites. No one wept over them, no one pitied them. They had lost the revolutionary spirit, were no longer Marxist-Leninists, but corpses of Bolshevism. They had united with Khrushchev and allowed mud to be thrown at Stalin and his work. They tried to do something, but not on the party road, because for them, too, the party did not exist.

All those who opposed Khrushchev, in one way or another, or were no longer necessary to him, were to suffer the same fate.

The Khrushchevites liquidated Zhukov from the political scene after having exploited him for their own ends.

For years on end the "great merits" of Zhukov were publicized, his activity during the great patriotic war was used to throw mud at Stalin, and as minister of defence his hand was used for the triumph of Khrushchev's putsch. But later, we suddenly learned that he had been discharged from the functions he held. During those days Zhukov was on a visit to our country. We welcomed him warmly as an old cadre and hero of the Stalinist Red Army, talked about problems of the defence of our country and the socialist camp, and did not notice anything disturbing in his opinions. On the contrary, since he had come from Yugoslavia, where he had been on a visit, he told us: "With what I saw in Yugoslavia, I

don't understand what sort of socialist country it is." From this we sensed that he was not of one mind with Khrushchev. On the very day that he left, we learned that he had been removed from the post of minister of defence of the USSR for "mistakes" and "grave faults" in his application of the "line of the party," for violations of the "law in the army," etc, etc. I cannot say whether or not Zhukov was guilty of mistakes and faults in these directions, but it is possible that the reasons went deeper.

In one meeting at Khrushchev's their attitude towards Zhukov had made an impression on me. I can't remember what year it was, but it was summer and I was on holiday in the south of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev had asked me to lunch. The local people there were Mikoyan, Kirichenko, Nina Petrovna (Khrushchev's wife), and some others. Apart from me, Ulbricht and Grotewohl were there as foreign guests. We were sitting outside, eating and drinking on the veranda. When Zhukov came, Khrushchev invited him to sit down. Zhukov seemed out of sorts. Mikoyan got up and said to him:

"I am the tamada, (master of ceremonies, Russian in the original). Fill your glass."

"I can't drink" said Zhukov, "I am not well."

"Fill it, I say," insisted Mikoyan in an authoritarian tone. "I give the orders here, not you."

Nina Khrushcheva intervened:

"Don't force him when it harms him, Anastasiy Ivanovich," she said to Mikoyan.

Zhukov said nothing and did not fill his glass. Khrushchev changed the subject by cracking jokes with Mikoyan.

Can it be that the contradictions with Zhukov had begun to arise as early as that. And that they had begun to insult him and to show him that others were giving the orders and not he? Perhaps Khrushchev and company had begun to fear the power which they themselves had given Zhukov in order to seize state power, and that is why they accused him of "bonapartism" later? Could it possibly be that information about Zhukov's views on Yugoslavia reached Khrushchev before Zhukov returned to the Soviet Union? In any case, Zhukov was eliminated from the political scene despite his four "hero of the Soviet Union" stars, a series of orders of Lenin, and countless other decorations.

[19 Oct 80]

[Text] Tirana, 19 Oct (ATA)--Kirichenko also was slapped down by Khrushchev.

After the 20th Congress, Khrushchev elevated Kirichenko to the top and made him one of the main figures of the leadership. I had met him in Kiev many years before, when he was first secretary of the Ukraine. This big florid-faced man who did not make a bad impression on me, did not welcome me haughtily or as a mere formality. He did not fail to respond to my love for Stalin with the same terms and expressions of admiration and loyalty. However, since he was from the Ukraine, Kirichenko did not fail to speak about Khrushchev, too, about his "wisdom, ability, energy," etc. I did not see anything wrong with these expressions which seemed natural to me at that time.

In the Kremlin I frequently had occasion to sit at the table beside Kirichenko and talk to him. After Stalin's death, many banquets were organized, because at that period it was usually only at banquets that one met the leaders of the Soviet Union. The tables were set day and night, laden with food and drink to the point of revulsion. When I saw the Soviet comrades eating and drinking, I was reminded of Gargantua of Rabelais. These things occurred after the death of Stalin, when Soviet diplomacy was carried out through priyoms, and Khrushchevite "communism" was illustrated, apart from other things, with banquets, with caviar, and the wines of the Crimea.

At one of these priyoms, when I was sitting near Kirichenko, I said to Khrushchev in a loud voice:

"You must come to visit Albania some time, because you have gone everywhere else."

"I shall come," replied Khrushchev.

Kirichenko jumped in at once and said to Khrushchev:

"Albania is far away, so don't promise when you will go and how many days you will stay."

Of course, I did not like this intervention of his and asked:

"Why are you ill-disposed towards our country?"

He feigned regret over the incident, and to explain his gesture, said to me:

"Nikita Khrushchev is not well at present. We must look after him."

This was just a tale. Khrushchev was as healthy as a pig, and ate and drank enough for four.

Another time (at a reception, of course, as usual), I happened to be seated near Kirichenko again. Nexhmije was with me, too. It was July 1957, the time when Khrushchev had fixed things up with the Titoites and was flattering them, as well as exerting pressure on them. The Titoites seemed to like the flattery, while as to the pressure and the stabs in the back, they gave as good as they got. Khrushchev had informed me the night before, "In order to get my permission," that he was going to ask me to this dinner at which Zhukov and his wife, as well as Rankovic and Kardelj, with their wives, would be present. As was his custom, Khrushchev cracked jokes with Mikoyan. This is the way they combined their roles, with Khrushchev accompanying his arrows, trickery, wiles, lies, and threats with jibes at "Anastasiy" who played the "king's jester."

When he finished his introduction with jokes with the "king's jester," Khrushchev, in proposing a toast, started to give us a lecture about the three-sided friendship that ought to exist between Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and the four-sided friendship between the Soviet Union, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

"The relations of the Soviet Union with Yugoslavia have not proceeded in a straight line," he said. "At first they were good, then they were cool, then they were

broken off, and later, following our visit to Belgrade it seemed they were put right. Then the rocket went up (he was referring to events of October-November 1956 in Hungary), and they were ruined again, but now the objective and subjective conditions have been created for them to improve. Meanwhile the relations of Yugoslavia with Albania and Bulgaria have not yet been improved, and as I told Rankovic and Kardelj earlier, the Yugoslavs must stop their undercover activity against those countries."

"It is the Albanians who do not leave us in peace," interjected Rankovic.

Then I intervened and listed for Rankovic the anti-Albanian actions, sabotage, subversion, and the plots which they organized against us. That night we had Khrushchev "on our side," but he soft-pedalled his criticism of the Yugoslavs.

"I don't understand this name of your party, the 'League of Communists of Yugoslavia'," said Khrushchev, waving his glass. "What is this word 'league'? Besides, you Yugoslavs don't like the term 'socialist camp'. But tell us, what should we call it, the 'neutral camp'. The 'camp of neutral countries'? We are all socialist countries, or are you not a socialist country?"

"We are, of course, we are," said Kardelj.

"Then come and join us, we are the majority," replied Khrushchev.

Khrushchev was on his feet throughout all this discourse, interspersed with shouts and gestures, and full of "criticism" of the Yugoslavs, which he delivered in the context of his efforts to stand over Tito, who never agreed to consider Khrushchev as the "head" of the council.

Kirichenko, who was beside me, listened in silence. Later he asked me in a low voice:

"Who is this woman beside me?"

"My wife, Nexhmije," I replied.

"Couldn't you have told me earlier? I have been keeping my mouth shut, thinking that she is the wife of one of them," he told me, indicating the Yugoslavs. He exchanged greetings with Nexhmije and then began to abuse the Yugoslavs.

Meanwhile Khrushchev continued his "criticisms" of the Yugoslavs and tried to convince them that it was me (of course, under the name of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party), and no one else who ought to be at the "head." He was getting at Tito, who, for his part, tried to place himself and the Yugoslav party above everyone.

"It would be ridiculous," he told them, "for us to be at the head of the camp if the other parties did not think us worthy, just as it would be ridiculous for any other party to consider itself at the head when the others do not consider it so."

Kardelj and Rankovic replied coolly making great efforts to appear calm, but it was very easy to understand that internally they were boiling. Tito had instructed them to defend his positions well and they wanted to do their master's bidding.

The dialogue between them was dragging on, frequently interrupted by the shouts of Khrushchev, but I was no longer listening. Apart from the reply I gave Rankovic, when he made the accusation that we had interfered in their affairs, I exchanged not one word with them. I talked the whole time with Kirichenko, who left nothing unsaid against the Yugoslavs and described the whole stand of our party towards the revisionist leadership of Yugoslavia as very correct.

But, this Kirichenko, also, was slapped down by Khrushchev later. Although foreign observers for a time considered him to rank second after Khrushchev, he was sent to a small remote town of Russia, without doubt, virtually in exile. One of our military students told us when he returned to Albania:

"I was travelling on a train and a Soviet passenger came and sat down beside me, pulled out the paper and began to read. After a while he laid down the paper and, as is customary, asked me: 'Where are you going?' I told him. Noticing the accent with which I spoke Russian, he asked me: 'What is your nationality?' 'I am an Albanian,' I said. The traveller was surprised, but pleased, looked at the door of the carriage, turned to me, and shook my hand warmly, saying: 'I admire the Albanians.' I was surprised by his stand," said our officer, "because at this time the fight with the Khrushchevites had begun." It was the period after the meeting of 81 parties. "'Who are you?' I asked," related the officer. "'I am Kirichenko,' he told me. When he told me his name, I realized who he was," our officer told us, "and I prepared myself to talk to him, but he straight away said: 'Shall we play dominoes?' 'All right,' I replied, and he pulled the box of dominoes out of his pocket and we began the game. I quickly understood why he wanted to play dominoes. He wanted to tell me something and to cover his voice with the rattle of the dominoes on the table. And he began: 'Good for your party, which exposed Khrushchev. Long live Enver Hoxha. Long live socialist Albania.' And in this way we continued a very friendly talk, covered by the rattle of the dominoes. While we were talking, other people entered the compartment. He placed the last domino saying: 'Don't yield, give Enver my best wishes.' And took the newspaper and started to read it as if we had never met," said our officer in conclusion.

Khrushchev and company did the utmost to spread and cultivate their anti-Marxist and putschist actions and methods in all the other communist and workers' parties.

Speaking about the efforts made by Khrushchev and company to spread and cultivate their anti-Marxist and putschist actions and methods in all the other communist and workers' parties, Comrade Enver Hoxha writes in his book that the process of large-scale rehabilitations, disguised as the "correction of mistakes made in the past," was transformed into an unprecedented campaign in all the former countries of people's democracy. The doors of the prisons were opened everywhere, the chiefs of other parties were competing with each other as to who would be quickest to release the most condemned enemies from the prisons, and who would give them the most positions right up to the head of the party and the state. Every day the newspapers and magazines of these parties published communiques and reports about this spring of the revisionist Mafia, the pages of the press were filled with the speeches of Tito, Ulbricht and other revisionist chiefs, while "PRAVDA" and TASS hastened to report these events and to spread them as "advanced examples."

Plots against and open pressure on the Party of Labour of Albania.

We saw what was occurring and felt the pressure mounting against us from all sides, but we did not waver a fraction from our course and our line.

This could not fail to anger Tito and company, first of all, because, exalted by the decisions of the 20th Congress and what was occurring in other countries, they expected a cataclysm in Albania, too. The activity of the Titoites who worked in the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana, against our party and country, was stepped up.

Taking advantage of our correct behaviour and the facilities we had provided for them to carry out their task, the Yugoslav diplomats in Tirana, on orders and instructions from Belgrade, started to arouse and reactivate their old agents in our country, instructed them and gave them the signal to attack. The attempt to attack the leadership of our party at the Tirana conference in April 1956, an attempt which failed, was the work of the Belgrade revisionists but, at the same time, it was also the work of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites. With their revisionist theses and ideas, the latter were the inspirers of the plot, while the Titoites and their secret agents were the organizers.

When they saw that this plot had failed, the Soviet leaders, who posed as our friends to the death and men of principle, did not fail to make demands and exert pressure on us openly.

On the eve of the 3rd Congress of our party, which was held at the end of May and the beginning of June 1956, Suslov quite openly demanded that our leadership should "re-examine" and "correct" its line in the past.

"There is nothing for our party to re-examine in its line," we told him bluntly. "We have never permitted serious mistakes of principle in our line."

"You should re-examine the case of Koci Xoxe and his comrades, whom you condemned earlier," Suslov told us.

"They were and still are traitors and enemies of our party and people, enemies of the Soviet Union and socialism," we replied bluntly. "If their trials were reviewed a hundred times, they would be described only as enemies a hundred times. Such was the nature of their activity."

Then Suslov began to speak about the things that were occurring in the other parties and the Soviet party in regard to looking at this problem with a "more generous," "more humane" eye.

"This has made a great impression on and has been welcomed by the peoples," he said. "This is what should occur with you too."

"If we were to rehabilitate the enemies and traitors, those who wanted to place the country in the chains of a new slavery, our people would stone us," we told Khrushchev's ideologist.

When he saw that he was getting nowhere with this Suslov changed his tack.

"All right," he said, "since you are convinced they are enemies, that is what they must be. But there is one thing you should do: You should refrain from speaking of their links with the Yugoslavs and should no longer describe them as agents of Belgrade."

"Here we are speaking of the truth," we said. "And the truth is that Koci Xoxe and his collaborators in the plot were downright agents of the Yugoslav revisionists. We have made known world-wide the links of Koci Xoxe with the Yugoslavs for hostile activities against our party and country and the great mass of facts which prove this. The Soviet leadership knows them very well. Perhaps you have not had the chance to acquaint yourself with the facts and, since you persist in your opinion, let us present some of them to you."

Suslov could hardly contain his temper. We calmly listed some of the main facts and finally stressed:

"This is the truth about the links of Koci Xoxe with the Yugoslav revisionists."

"Da, da," yes, yes (Russian in the original) he repeated impatiently.

"And how can we distort this truth?" we asked him. "Is it permissible for a party to conceal or distort what has been proved with countless facts, to please this or that person?"

Suslov snorted, "But there is no other way you can repair your relations with Yugoslavia."

Everything had become more than clear to us. Behind the "fraternal" intervention of Suslov lurked the Khrushchev-Tito deals. The Tito group, which had now gained ground, was certainly demanding as much as possible space, along with economic, military and political advantages. Tito had insisted with Khrushchev that the Titoite traitors such as Koci Xoxe, Rajk, Kostov, etc, be rehabilitated. While Tito achieved this aim in Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, he was quite unable to do so in our country. In those countries the traitors were rehabilitated and the Marxist-Leninist party leaderships were undermined. This was the joint work of Khrushchev and Tito. With our resolute and unwavering stand towards him, we were a thorn in Tito's flesh. And if the enemies dared to undertake actions against us, we would counteract. Tito had long known this, and Khrushchev knew it and was becoming convinced of it, too. He, of course, was inclined to restrict Tito's roads and not allow him to graze in the "pastures" which Khrushchev considered his own.

Result of lack of principle in Khrushchev's political stand.

About 15 to 20 days after the 3rd Congress of our party, in June 1956, I was in Moscow for a consultation, about which I spoke above, in which the leaders of the parties of all the socialist countries took part. Although the purpose of the consultation was to discuss economic problems, Khrushchev, as was his custom, took the opportunity to raise all the other problems.

There, in the presence of all the representatives of the other parties, he admitted with his own mouth the pressure which Tito had exerted on him for the rehabilitation of Koci Xoxe and other enemies condemned in Albania.

"With Tito," said Khrushchev among other things, "we talked about the relations of Yugoslavia with the other states. Tito was pleased with the Poles, the Hungarians, the Czechs, the Bulgarians and the others, but he spoke very angrily about Albania, thumping his fist and stamping his feet. 'The Albanians are not in order, they are not on the right road,' Tito told me, 'They do not recognize the mistakes they have made and have understood nothing from all these things that are taking place'."

In fact, by repeating Tito's words and accusations Khrushchev found the opportunity to put out all the spite and ire he felt against us, because at the congress we did not rehabilitate Koci Xoxe, "whom Tito described as a great patriot," stressed Khrushchev.

"When Tito spoke about the Albanian comrades he was trembling with rage, but I opposed him and said to him, 'These are the internal affairs of the Albanian comrades, and they will know how to solve them,'" said Khrushchev, continuing his "report," trying to convince us that he had had a great "quarrel" with Tito. However, we were now well aware of the meaning of the neverending kisses and quarrels between these two heralds of modern revisionism.

Up to his neck in treachery, Tito hatched up numerous plots against the socialist countries. However, when Khrushchev betrayed, he strutted like a "peacock" and posed as Khrushchev's "teacher." Tito was quite right to demand a great deal from him, and did not hang back in this direction. He aimed to make Khrushchev obey him and act according to his orders. Tito had the backing of American imperialism and world reaction, therefore Khrushchev, for his part, followed the tactic of making approaches to Tito, in order to flatter him and win him over, to embrace him and eventually strangle him. However, he was dealing with Tito, who had his own tactic of making approaches to Khrushchev in order to impose himself on him and to submit to him, to dictate to him and not to take orders from him, to get the maximum possible unconditional aid and to compel Khrushchev to subjugate all Belgrade's opponents, first of all, the Party of Labour of Albania.

It is precisely for these reasons that we see many zig zags in Khrushchev's line towards Tito--sometimes they got on well, sometimes their relations were embittered, sometimes he attacked and cursed him and at other times he retracted only to criticize him again. This was the result of lack of principle in his political stand. Tito and Khrushchev were two revisionists, two agents of capitalism, who had things in common, but also contradictions, which were expressed in the zig zags and erratic behaviour of that time, which continue to this day between Tito and Khrushchev's heirs.

There was nothing Marxist-Leninist in their actions and stands. They were guided by counter-revolutionary aims and had assumed the leadership of revisionism, which is capitalism in a new form, the enemy of the unity of peoples, the inciter of reactionary nationalism, of the drive towards and establishment of the most ferocious fascist dictatorship which does not permit even the slightest sign of formal bourgeois democracy. Revisionism is the idea and action which leads the turning of a country from socialism back to capitalism, the turning of a communist party into a fascist party, it is the inspirer of ideological chaos, confusion, corruption, repression, arbitrariness, instability and putting the homeland up for auction. This tragedy occurred in the Soviet Union and the other revisionist countries. Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites, incited and assisted by American imperialism and world capitalism, created this situation.

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